Quantum Key Distribution Investment by Canadian Government
Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen
Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project
Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/05/05
Cordell Grant is a pioneering aerospace engineer, cryptography enthusiast, and well’s CEO and co-founder of QEYnet. With over 20 years of experience leading low-cost, high-performance satellite programs—including BRITE-Constellation, CanX-4&-5, and GHGSat-D—he has been at the forefront of innovative space technology. Cordell’s academic background spans a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics from Cape Breton University, a Bachelor of Engineering from Dalhousie, and a Master of Applied Science from the University of Toronto Institute for Aerospace Studies, Space Flight Laboratory. His passion for space exploration and secure communications fuels his pioneering satellite-based quantum key distribution work. Renowned for merging space and cryptography. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic method that uses quantum mechanics to exchange encryption keys securely. Unlike classical encryption, QKD transmits individual photons, making interception detectable. Ground-based QKD relies on fibre optics, which introduces signal loss, limiting its range. Space-based QKD, using satellites, enables global encryption key exchange without intermediaries. The Canadian Space Agency invests in QEYNet to counteract threats from quantum computing, which could break classical encryption. QKD secures long-term satellite communications by allowing in-orbit re-keying. This technology reduces costs, enhances security, and facilitates the development of scalable global quantum networks.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: What is quantum key distribution?
Cordell Grant: Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic technology that has been in development for about 40 years, first proposed in the early 1980s. At its core, QKD enables the secure exchange of encryption keys using quantum mechanics.
Unlike classical key exchange methods, QKD transmits individual photons—quantum particles of light—from one party to another. Each photon is polarized in a specific but randomly chosen way.
Fundamental quantum principles ensure that any attempt to intercept these photons disturbs their state, making eavesdropping detectable. This property guarantees the security of the exchanged encryption keys, as unauthorized interception cannot go undetected.
QKD’s reliance on the laws of physics rather than computational complexity makes it exceptionally secure. However, a key challenge has been reliably transmitting single photons over long distances. This is where advancements in QKD technology, including space-based systems, play a crucial role.
Jacobsen: How does QKD technology enhance data security in space compared to ground-based methodologies? Is there a significant difference?
Grant: There is a significant difference between ground-based and space-based QKD. On the ground, photons are typically transmitted through fibre optic cables. While fibre optics are widely used for data transmission, they introduce signal loss. At the single-photon level, this loss becomes significant, limiting the effective range of QKD to about 100–150 kilometres without using trusted relay nodes.
If we attempt to scale QKD globally using fibre optics alone, we would require numerous intermediate stations to receive, store, and retransmit the encryption keys, which introduces security vulnerabilities.
Space-based QKD offers a more efficient solution. Instead of relying on fibre optics, photons are transmitted directly between ground stations and satellites. In space, there is no medium to absorb or scatter the photons, significantly reducing transmission loss over long distances.
A QKD-enabled satellite in orbit can establish secure key exchanges with multiple ground stations worldwide. By acting as a trusted intermediary, the satellite allows distant locations on Earth to securely share encryption keys without relying on fibre optic infrastructure or multiple ground-based relays.
This approach enhances global cybersecurity and enables highly secure communications for governments, financial institutions, and critical infrastructure.
Jacobsen: Why is the Canadian Space Agency investing $1.4 million in QEYnet?
Grant: The Canadian Space Agency has invested in this technology, specifically space-based quantum key distribution, for about 15 years. Canada has determined that this technology is valuable for various reasons.
The primary reason often cited for the importance of QKD, particularly space-based QKD, is the looming quantum threat posed by quantum computers. The basic premise is that quantum computers are advancing rapidly and becoming increasingly powerful. Once they reach a certain level of computational capability, they can break many encryption methodologies widely used worldwide.
A key example is public key encryption, which is used when logging into your bank’s website. This type of encryption relies on mathematical complexity, but that complexity applies only to classical computers. Quantum computers, however, are exceptionally efficient at solving the mathematical problems that underlie this encryption.
As a result, the encryption technologies we currently rely on are vulnerable to the advent of quantum computing. Since encryption is embedded in nearly every aspect of digital security, replacing existing systems with quantum-secure alternatives will take time.
QKD is one of the technologies being explored as a potential replacement. It ensures secure communication in preparation for what is sometimes called “Y2Q”—when quantum computers become powerful enough to break conventional encryption.
Jacobsen: Are we suggesting that Y2K wasn’t a real issue?
Grant: It was a real issue but wasn’t a major crisis because we prepared for it in advance. The hope with Y2Q is that the outcome will be similar—we will have taken proactive measures, preventing a catastrophic failure of banking systems or any other critical infrastructure by having quantum-secure systems in place ahead of time.
That’s the typical rationale for QKD. However, at QEYNet, our perspective is slightly different. Numerous applications already do not rely on the types of encryption at risk from quantum computers.
When you examine these applications, many employ surprising methods to distribute encryption keys—often involving the physical transport of key material. In the military, for example, encryption keys are frequently distributed using physical hardware, with large cryptographic devices transported globally to support troop deployments.
Similarly, diplomatic missions often carry physical encryption keys. A diplomat, for instance, might transport new key material to an embassy in a diplomatic pouch, which is protected from search and seizure at customs.
For our immediate use case—specifically, the one funded by the Canadian Space Agency—we are focused on securing communications for spacecraft.
Most people aren’t aware that, much like a spacecraft launches with all the fuel it will ever have, it also launches with all the encryption keys it will ever use. This is simply because transmitting new keys to an orbiting satellite is extremely difficult—and expensive.
Because satellite missions can last for decades, relying on conventional encryption methods, like those used in banking, may not be viable over the entire mission duration. The security of these encryption methods cannot be guaranteed indefinitely.
With QKD, we enable spacecraft to be re-keyed, making them more secure and fundamentally shifting the paradigm in the space industry. By offering QKD technology to other spacecraft providers, we help ensure their satellites remain protected throughout their operational lifespan.
Jacobsen: What are the benefits of successfully demonstrating space-based QKD technology?
Grant: Ultimately, we hope to prove that QKD works in space with this demonstration. Designing this hardware, testing it in a lab, or conducting field trials are just a few things. It’s entirely different to successfully execute QKD between Earth and an orbiting satellite 600 kilometres above.
We aim to demonstrate that all the analysis, mathematics, and testing done so far hold up in a real operational environment. It’s time to combine the pieces and prove we can achieve this in a compact system. The hardware that will be placed on the spacecraft is about the size of a two-litre milk carton. Yet, it will detect individual photons from 600 kilometres away.
Jacobsen: What cost challenges may arise with QKD technology in space? Any new technology tends to be more expensive than well-established alternatives with lower performance or efficiency.
Grant: Yes, there’s no doubt that launching anything into space is costly. One of the key differentiators of QEYNet is that we have deliberately worked to minimize these costs.
Many existing space-based QKD solutions are highly complex, driving up costs. We’ve taken two key steps to make our system more affordable, particularly for spacecraft manufacturers looking to secure their satellites.
First, we have placed the receiver in space rather than the transmitter. In QKD, the receiver is generally the more straightforward component. In contrast, generating individual, polarized photons is technically complex and requires significant data processing. Performing this photon generation onboard a spacecraft would be incredibly challenging due to limited resources such as power, processing capability, and weight constraints. Keeping the receiver in space significantly reduces the system’s complexity and cost.
Second, we have designed our system to eliminate many highly complex and resource-intensive components typically in QKD technology. Traditional QKD systems require highly sensitive detectors to measure individual photons. The most advanced detectors are designed for maximum efficiency, but they add to the overall cost and complexity of the system.
They need to be cooled to about minus 80 degrees Celsius, which requires extensive thermal control technology onboard the spacecraft and large radiators to dissipate excess heat. Instead, we use less efficient detectors that operate at room temperature. This allows us to eliminate all the additional hardware and complexity associated with cooling systems.
Another challenge with these so-called “better” detectors is that they are fibre-fed. This means they require a fibre optic cable in front of them and all the light collected from 600 kilometres away must be precisely focused by a large telescope onto the tiny tip of the fibre. This process must be executed in a highly dynamic thermal environment with constant changes, adding to the system’s complexity.
By contrast, the detectors we use do not require fibre feeding. They have a larger detection area, allowing us to shine the light directly onto them, eliminating the need for fine-pointing mechanisms and complex optical alignment.
These design choices reduce the cost of the satellites we will ultimately deploy by at least an order of magnitude, making the technology significantly more affordable and accessible.
At the very least, our solution is much more efficient than the existing methods of encryption key distribution—such as physically transporting hardware and personnel worldwide. Traditional methods are not only expensive but also pose security risks. Given these factors, we are confident that our approach will remain cost-competitive.
Jacobsen: What might be the broader benefits of QEYNet’s demonstration for quantum networks?
Grant: As I’ve described, the immediate application is spacecraft security. Once we successfully demonstrate this capability, we will validate the first half of our initial vision, where a satellite performs QKD exchanges with two separate locations and acts as an intermediary between them.
In this trial, we aim to demonstrate the ability to facilitate key exchanges between Earth and an orbiting satellite and between two separate locations on Earth via the satellite. If we achieve that, it opens up a wide range of possibilities.
One of the longstanding challenges with quantum networks is the chicken-and-egg problem. The technology already exists to build quantum networks for localized areas, such as an urban region. In any given city, for instance, you could leverage existing fibre optic infrastructure to create a functional quantum network.
However, the real challenge is that a local quantum network has limited value if it cannot connect to other regions. If it remains isolated, communications are restricted only within that local area.
That’s where satellites come in. But simultaneously, those seeking funding for quantum satellites face a dilemma. They can only connect point to point, and there aren’t yet established networks to expand the user base.
So, who goes first? Do we build the satellites, hoping the networks will follow? Or do we build the networks, hoping the satellites will be developed? Nothing will move forward until we demonstrate that the satellite technology is viable.
That’s why proving this technology in space—showing that it is affordable, reliable, and secure—is the first step toward making quantum networks more common and enabling their growth.
QKD technology is not something every person worldwide will use anytime soon. However, if it becomes readily available over the existing fibre optic infrastructure, many applications could benefit from it.
Jacobsen: Cordell, thank you very much for your time today. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Grant: It was fun.
Jacobsen: Excellent. Thank you. Bye.
Grant: Bye.
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