Philosopher and logician at the University of St Andrews in Scotland, originally from Australia.
I like thinking about—and helping other people think about—logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform and enhance each other.
I suppose I’m known for work on substructural logics, logical pluralism, and (more recently) what philosophers should know about proof theory, and proof theorists should know about philosophy.
Since logic requirements in philosophy graduate programs is trending, here's a throwback to 2005, when Brian Weatherson @bweatherson , Ted Sider, Michael Glanzberg, Andy Arana and I discussed this in a special session at an ASL/APA meeting https://richardzach.org/2005/04/logic-instruction-and-philosophy-graduate-training/
The discussion about whether to have #logic requirements in #philosophy PhD programs and if so what to cover has been going on for a while
@msteenhagen That analysis of the situation sounds right to me.
I’d add that the shift away from logic coincides with analytic philosophy’s repudiation of its linguistic turn, and the shift away from spending so much time on questions of language and meaning.
This is a shame, because there’s a lot of interesting recent work in metaethics, in philosophy of language, and even in metaphysics, where insights from formal logic and *semantics*—and not just “formal methods”—are absolutely central.
@xameer Well, since P∧¬Q entails ¬(P→Q) (intuitionistically and classically, at least) the first seems fine, but the second has plenty of counterexamples.
Suppose Tibbles is a cat (and hence, a mammal) and not a dog. “Tibbles is a mammal” (P) is true, and “Tibbles is a dog” (Q) is false. It doesn’t follow that “*if Tibbles is a dog, then Tibbles is a mammal*” (Q→P) is false. It’s true.
@dfaria I have a paper coming out in this volume. You can find a draft here: https://consequently.org/writing/contradictions-in-theology/
We've just published a new issue, with papers by Alessandro Rossi, Nathaniel Gan, Fabio De Martin Polo, and Alasdair Urquhart
@rrrichardzach Enjoy! (It’s ages since I was there last. I can’t wait to visit again sometime.)
Her work on depression is really interesting and provocative. I’ll be interested to learn more of the details, and to see where this research will lead. https://bigthink.com/neuropsych/depression-consciousness-disorder/
I’m delighted to be able to share that Cecily Whitely is joining the St Andrews Philosophy Department, from September 2023. https://www.cecilywhiteley.com
@bweatherson We were lucky to have her as a Masters student at Melbourne. Her work on speech acts and uptake was really good, and it was clear that she could go on to do great things.
If you’re into speech acts, discourse and the cultural norms around our communicative practices, this recent paper by Mitchell Green should be right up your alley.
He develops the provocative view that our practice of assertion has grown out of simpler practices, governed by fewer norms (call them “indicating” [transmit information] and “opining” […that you believe]), and that some kinds of discourse failure result from treating opining (or indicating) as assertion.
@chrisamaphone No, but thanks for the pointer. It looks useful.
This semester I was only doing two weeks on the liar paradox and its cousins, right at the end. My colleague Patrick Greenough set up the framework.
If you want to track down the references, and see more, you can download the slides and notes, linked here: https://consequently.org/class/2023/py4601/
I’m going there this afternoon in our last lecture on paradoxes.
ICYMI! I quite enjoyed writing this one: https://shadycharacters.co.uk/2023/03/miscellany-99-dollar-sign/
Here is the announcement for my Lakatos Award public lecture on 'The Dialogical Roots of Deduction' at the LSE on May 2nd 6pm. If you happen to be in London, do come 😊
In the afternoon, there will also be a workshop on the book; speakers are @wtgowers, Matthew Inglis, Mary Leng & Wes Wrigley.
Coming up next week: fixed points for fun and profit… and attempting to explain them to curious philosophy students interested in paradox.
@jonmsterling That’s such excellent news! Congratulations.
I look forward to our paths crossing, either when I head south or you come up to Scotland.
@kameryn This is hard to answer. I’m tempted to vote “no” if we keep the language in which we define things fixed (so “definable” is definable-in-L, for the given L) and vote “yes” if we are more generous, allowing the language to vary (so “r is definable” is (∃L)(r is defined in L).)
Then you need to be careful to show how the kind of diagonalisation you are worried about amounts to extending the language, but that’s an analogue to Tarski's indefinability theorem for truth.
Congratulations to the newly minted Dr Tore Øgaard! It was a delight to serve as an opponent for your doctoral defence, and I look forward to learning more from you in the years ahead! / cc @standefer
