s�d

e-sydb

I toot everyday, mutual interactions welcome <3, I love cooking and tinkering, tell me about your special interests⚧️

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s�dpl
2026-01-17

@navi xD I read the other day that the Nokia N900 had such big capacitors they you could do a live battery swap

s�dpl
2026-01-11

@ZLabe omg 😭

s�dpl
2026-01-11

In case you are having a bad day. How about you enjoy this A+ performance of someone playing the Celtic instrument "carnyx"?

youtube.com/watch?v=auR-lJfzTeY

s�dpl
2026-01-05

what if we made wayland run in the init process already?

s�dpl
2026-01-05
s�dpl
2026-01-05

@plom Also Johan Sebastian Bass nicht Bach :'D

Update: CN Gore für das Video (kannte nur Musik bis jetzt)
youtube.com/watch?v=Z3vgYg1pWVA

s�dpl
2026-01-04

@sandro the day Sandro discoveres something new in NixOS 💜🎊

s�dpl
2026-01-04

@leah when I was a kid and first started using Linux, I really was amazed I could copy the text form almost all GUI elements - really felt that this is how it should be :'D but that's gone again (I guess with special screenreader devices one could extract a lot of UI texts)

s�dpl
2026-01-02

@lnl That feature is implemented through

electronjs.org/docs/latest/api

which isn't documented by Signal at all, worse - Signal doesn't warn you when it's in "Basic" mode. In combination with depending on `safeStorage` which is a spoiled implementation

Other issues with "when the key(s with password-store) is extracted" remain. An attacker shouldn't be able to run a second authenticated client in parallel without any visual indicator that this is happening (or why you aren't receiving messages).

s�dpl
2026-01-02

@rugk > is not signal here

Sorry, but the real issue is Signal, it's bad that you can spawn a second client overtaking the other clients key-material silently blocking the main one receiving messages. What you're trying to solve is an entire different one - and I'm not only talking about Linux.

s�dpl
2026-01-02

@fisk might even be partially solvable with more documentation, for example what to do/consequences if a computer was accessed by an untrusted party. I've had someone reaching out to me to help after a breakup before, it's really tough for less technical people to navigate those things.

s�dpl
2026-01-02

@fisk yeah true - Signed executables etc is really missing.

I think I just wish it would make it obvious if someone is trying to run a second Signal instance with the same keys.

And also of course I Signals organization occasionally a bit hypocritical. One the one hand they are extremely critical towards others, but in parallel some of the security posture is definitively dangerous. Threats like "my ex partner had access to my computer and copied the `.config/Signal` folder" are valid

s�dpl
2026-01-02

@fisk That would be nice. I've spawned one client, duplicated the contents of Signal config folder.

Spawned a second client, then closed the first one.

The client that has started the earliest takes over control.

Now after like ~12 hours, starting the second one (closing the first one) has no previous messages, but is able to send/receive messages. (Interestingly with an error message).

Not sure when/how the double ratchet would take effect on newly sent messages.

s�dpl
2026-01-02
s�dpl
2026-01-02

@david_chisnall Thanks for taking time to create your write-up. I'm well aware of everything you're saying. If you check the thread, I've linked someone showcasing a POC for example Yubikey integration.

As I said, my criticism is that Signal President in my linked talk is explaining that Microsoft Recall had exactly the same shortcoming as Signal Desktop (data basically easily extractable) - but Signal doesn't.

Protecting against key-duplication is nearly impossible, safeguards certainly are.

s�dpl
2026-01-01

I've just replicated this exact scenario on a recent version of Signal Desktop on Linux.

Full write-up of the issue
cryptographycaffe.sandboxaq.co

@signalapp

s�dpl
2026-01-01

Really enjoyed @Mer__edith and Udbhav Tiwari at

media.ccc.de/v/39c3-ai-agent-a

But @signalapp should please become resilient against scenarios outlined during the talk!

Currently malware can copy `~/.config/Signal`. An attacker can run a second client, if user goes offline attacker receives all messages - with no indicator that this is happening.

If both are online, there is no warning towards the user, worse the user will receive no future messages.

github.com/signalapp/Signal-De

s�dpl
2026-01-01

Client Info

Server: https://mastodon.social
Version: 2025.07
Repository: https://github.com/cyevgeniy/lmst