#ArrowsTheorem

2025-04-28
My half-baked deep thought of the weekend:

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem should be renamed Arrow's Context-Sensitivity Theorem, and re-interpreted as saying a social choice function that neglects context leads to dictators.

I say this because the axiom of independence from irrelevant alternatives--one of the assumptions behind the theorem--states that a social choice function should be such that the relationship between A and B is not changed once a new alternative C is introduced. Unpacked, this means the choice function should be insensitive to any context C might bring with it.

Arrow's theorem essentially says that a social choice function satisfying this and a couple other axioms leads to dictators (meaning, one individual's preferences dictate the social choice function's preferences, overruling everyone else involved in the choice who might disagree). Hence the re-interpretation: neglecting context in social choice leads to dictators.

#economics #SocialWelfare #SocialChoice #WelfareEconomics #DecisionTheory #ArrowsTheorem
2025-02-12

I’d like to share some thoughts on a fascinating topic: why democracy—as a decision-making process—is, in a strict mathematical sense, impossible when you have more than one participant. This idea has been influentially formalized in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, which provides a set of criteria that any fair voting system should ideally meet. Unfortunately, Arrow’s work—and many subsequent proofs by scholars like Yu, Geanakoplos, and others—shows that no voting method can perfectly satisfy all these fairness criteria simultaneously when converting individual preferences into a collective decision.

In a nutshell, the theorem illustrates that when voters rank multiple options, trying to find a method that always reflects individual values, maintains consistency, and respects collective rationality leads to an inherent contradiction. For instance, one of the key issues is that any system must sometimes arbitrarily privilege one candidate over another based on small shifts in voter preferences. This phenomenon can even lead to paradoxical outcomes where, for example, a supposedly “more democratic” decision ends up being self-defeating.

These findings do not mean that democracy is unworkable—in fact, democratic systems have evolved to accommodate human imperfections. The mathematical impossibility points out a trade-off: all voting systems have built-in limitations, no matter how sophisticated they are. In our modern, high-information society, there’s a growing opportunity to refine our methods (think of innovations like ranked-choice voting, liquid democracy, or even sortition-based approaches) to better capture the complex voice of a diverse populace.

If you’re curious to delve deeper into these ideas, I highly recommend checking out the TED Talk by Alex Gendler, “Which Voting System Is the Best?” It offers a really approachable introduction to the subject. Additionally, there’s a treasure trove of academic work on Arrow’s theorem and its implications available through resources like this video youtu.be/qf7ws2DF-zk by Veritasium and various research papers (by Maskin, Sen, Black, and others) that explore the nuances of social choice theory.
Ultimately, while democracy might be “mathematically impossible” to perfect, engaging with these ideas can help us understand our systems better and inspire innovations that move us closer to fairer, more representative governance. It’s a reminder that striving for improvements—even in imperfect systems—is both necessary and worthwhile.

Additionally, I recommend checking out the French-speaking channel Science4All, which has produced a great series exploring the theoretical and mathematical concepts behind democratic election systems. Their video “Le scrutin de Condorcet randomisé | Démocratie 5” (youtu.be/wKimU8jy2a8?list=PLtz) offers, in my opinion, one of the best explanations of Condorcet elections—a perfect launchpad if you decide to take a deeper dive into these topics.

#Democracy #SocialChoiceTheory #VotingSystems #ArrowsTheorem #CondorcetMethod #PoliticalInnovation #CivicEngagement

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