Ivan Ožić Bebek

Penetration Tester

Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-20
Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-19

Chisel Client: From 16/65 to 1/65 flagged on VirusTotal jadu101.github.io/RedTeam/AV-E

Ivan Ožić Bebek boosted:
2025-06-19

I successfully tested a LSASS dumping technique on a Windows 10 lab machine, which we encountered on a recent Incident Response engagement (no EDR, default Defender installed).

The "MiniDumpWriteDump" technique, as described here [1], was successful in writing the LSASS process to disk.

However, as soon as I tried to copy the dump to my Kali machine, Defender jumped into action, prohibited access to the LSASS dump, and removed the file to the quarantine. And here is the catch.

I browsed to the following folder:
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Quarantine

In the ResourceData folder, you will find different sub-folders (or not, if Defender never quarantined something on that host), each folder containing a quarantine file.

The files are encrypted with a static key that leaked years ago, and this 10-year-old code snippet is still sufficient to decrypt the files back to their original state. [2]

Long story short: I copied the encrypted file to my Kali machine, decrypted it using the Python code from [2], and extracted the credentials and hashes with pypykatz. [3]

Classic example of "No, it's not enough when your AV blocked or removed a threat". As you can see, an attacker can easily get the LSASS dump, even if Defender removed it from the disk ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

[1 ]ired.team/offensive-security/c
[2] raw.githubusercontent.com/malm
[3] github.com/skelsec/pypykatz

Ivan Ožić Bebek boosted:
RedTeam PentestingRedTeamPentesting
2025-06-18

And this is our pull request to NetExec which adds efsr_spray which can re-enable EFSR/PetitPotam on up-to-date Windows 11 hosts 🤯 if they have a writeable share:

github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/

Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-18
Ivan Ožić Bebek boosted:
2025-06-16

A solid, back-to-basics overview of lateral movement from @huntress:

huntress.com/blog/how-huntress

Ivan Ožić Bebek boosted:
2025-06-15
[RSS] CVE-2025-26685 - Spoofing to Elevate Privileges with Microsoft Defender for Identity

https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/network-pentesting/microsoft-defender-for-identity-spoofing-cve-2025-26685/
Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-13

PoC Exploit for the NTLM reflection SMB flaw github.com/mverschu/CVE-2025-3

Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-11

“Localhost tracking” explained. It could cost Meta 32 billion. zeropartydata.es/p/localhost-t

Ivan Ožić Bebek boosted:
RedTeam PentestingRedTeamPentesting
2025-06-11

Based on our testing, MS seems to have fixed CVE-2025-33073 by blocking the CredUnmarshalTargetInfo/CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATIONW trick!
@tiraniddo@decoder_it

mastodon.social/@RedTeamPentes

Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-11

wspcoerce coerces a Windows computer account via SMB to an arbitrary target using MS-WSP github.com/RedTeamPentesting/w

Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-11

NTLM reflection is dead, long live NTLM reflection! – An in-depth analysis of CVE-2025-33073 synacktiv.com/en/publications/

Ivan Ožić Bebek boosted:
2025-06-11

Getting RCE on Monero forums with wrapwrap swap.gs/posts/monero-forums/

Ivan Ožić Bebek boosted:
2025-06-10

This post describes how COM hijacking enables attackers to persist by loading malicious code through trusted Windows applications like Chrome🕵️‍♂️

specterops.io/blog/2025/05/28/

#infosec #cybersecurity #pentest #redteam #windows

Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-08
Ivan Ožić Bebek boosted:
2025-06-06

Surprise surprise, 5 minutes of reading Cloudflare's AI-generated OAuth provider shows that it was not, in fact, "thoroughly reviewed and cross-referenced with relevant RFCs, by security experts with previous experience with those RFCs"

github.com/cloudflare/workers-

Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-04

Breaking ADCS: ESC1 to ESC16 Attack Techniques xbz0n.sh/blog/adcs-complete-at

Ivan Ožić Bebekobivan@infosec.exchange
2025-06-03

"NO CGI" is really just INVISIBLE CGI (5/5) youtube.com/watch?v=hniWOH_zwh8

Client Info

Server: https://mastodon.social
Version: 2025.04
Repository: https://github.com/cyevgeniy/lmst