#nuclearWeapons

2026-02-18

Iran says “clearer path ahead” to nuclear deal with U.S. after talks in Geneva under shadow of Trump’s threats

U.S. and Iranian negotiators sat down for high-stakes talks Tuesday in Geneva, with President Trump’s threat to launch…
#NewsBeep #News #Topstories #AyatollahAliKhamenei #DonaldTrump #Headlines #Iran #Israel #MiddleEast #Nuclearweapons #TopStories #War
newsbeep.com/400341/

The Japan Timesthejapantimes
2026-02-18

The United States is ready to carry out low-yield nuclear tests to match alleged secret explosions by China and Russia, ending a decades-old moratorium, a senior official said Tuesday. japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/02/

2026-02-17

Iran announces closure of vital shipping route during US nuclear talks
By Brad Ryan

Iran says it temporarily closed the Strait of Hormuz — a vital international shipping route — as it entered a new round of talks with the US over its nuclear capabilities.

abc.net.au/news/2026-02-18/ira

#WorldPolitics #UnrestConflictandWar #NuclearWeapons #BradRyan

The State Signalthestatesignal
2026-02-17

The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said on Tuesday that the US-Iran talks in Geneva scheduled to begin at 12:30 Iran time (0900 GMT) will focus on the nuclear issue. thestatesignal.com/us-iran-tal

2026-02-16

Trump 2.0 Must Urgently Declare Its Position Towards Poland’s Nuclear Weapons Plans

Trump 2.0 Must Urgently Declare Its Position Towards Poland’s Nuclear Weapons Plans

By Andrew Korybko

Telling it to stand down would avert the potentially uncontrollable proliferation of nukes in the post-START world while turning a blind eye towards France’s possible assistance, let alone directly helping Poland develop nukes, could radically worsen the already dangerous NATO-Russian security dilemma.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki recently told Polsat News that he’s “a great supporter of Poland joining the nuclear project. This path, with respect to all international regulations, is the path we should follow. (…) We need to act in this direction so that we can begin work.” Although he’s not sure whether the government will indeed act in this direction, he added that Poland should still at least build its “nuclear potential”, thus hinting that its planned US-built nuclear power plant could help with this.

It was already assessed last September after Nawrocki’s unsubtle hint to French media about Poland’s relevant intentions at the time that “The US Is Expected To Tacitly Back Poland’s Nuclear Weapons Plans”. For background, France had already by that point suggested that Poland could participate in its nuclear-sharing program, which Nawrocki is eager to do. The possibility therefore exists that France, whether in coordination with the US or with its approval, could also help Poland develop nukes.

The preceding hyperlinked analysis also assessed that “Russia probably won’t risk war with NATO by launching a preventive strike against French nukes in Poland or Polish nuclear facilities” due to the US’ continued commitment to Article 5, especially with respect to Poland, one of its top allies anywhere. After Trump 2.0 let the New START lapse earlier this month without extending it per Putin’s proposal, however, fears began to abound about a global nuclear arms race, which were touched upon here.

That analysis reminded readers that “international law is only upheld if there are credible enforcement mechanisms or the political will to unilaterally enforce international law if the aforesaid no longer exist, which is arguably the case at present due to the UNSC’s dysfunctional deadlock over the past decade.” So long as an aspiring European nuclear power like Poland is still under the US’ nuclear umbrella, readers are also reminded, then Russia is unlikely to risk World War III by attacking their nuclear facilities.

The aforementioned insight shouldn’t be interpreted as implying that Poland, Germany, the Nordics, or anyone else in Europe will soon develop nuclear weapons, however, since it’s inconceivable that any of those countries would embark on such a program without the US’ tacit approval at the very least. Thus far, Poland is the only one to openly declare its intentions, so the ball is now in the US’ court over whether to order one of its top allies anywhere to stand down, turn a blind eye to this, or help them.

While some in Trump 2.0 might calculate that a nuclear Poland could lead Russia’s containment in Europe after the Ukrainian Conflict ends, this assumes that the Polish leadership will always remain rational, and it’s already arguable whether it’s even rational at present. There’s also the credible concern that Poland could deploy its nukes in third countries like the Baltics and/or Ukraine, possibly even giving them the authority to use tactical variants thereof, which would spike the risk of World War III.

Trump 2.0 must therefore urgently declare its position on this issue so that there isn’t any ambiguity about where it stands. Even turning a blind eye towards France helping Poland develop nukes, which the US might do for reasons of “plausible deniability” in a bid to manage tensions with Russia, could radically worsen the already dangerous NATO-Russian security dilemma. Letting this go ahead risks opening Pandora’s box and resulting in the uncontrollable proliferation of nukes across Europe and the world.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#DonaldTrump #Europe #France #Geopolitics #NATO #NuclearWeapons #Poland #Russia #Ukraine #USA
2026-02-16

Kaliningrad must not be a nuclear threat in the heart of Europe. All nuclear weapons must be withdrawn and the region placed under international supervision. Security in Europe requires de-escalation — not intimidation. #Kaliningrad #NuclearWeapons #EuropeanSecurity #ArmsControl #InternationalLaw

2026-02-16

Brazil-Russia Nuclear Diplomacy Challenges Washington’s Hemispheric Dominance

Brazil-Russia Nuclear Diplomacy Challenges Washington’s Hemispheric Dominance

By Uriel Araujo

A renewed Brazil-Russia nuclear partnership covers energy generation, fuel cycles, and advanced reactors. The agreement emerges as Brazil reassesses defence, energy security, and strategic partnerships. In a multipolar context, the move quietly challenges US dominance in Latin America.

Brazil and Russia have just signed a declaration reaffirming their commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Such declaration emerged from renewed bilateral talks covering topics such as the nuclear fuel cycle, regulatory cooperation – plus modernizing the legal framework governing nuclear collaboration between the two countries. This matters because those discussions were embedded in a broader defence of multilateralism and a sharp critique of “unilateral coercive measures,” a wording that hardly conceals its target.

Moscow has expressed willingness to share nuclear technologies with Brazil across several domains, including electricity generation, fuel fabrication, and medical applications such as radioisotopes for cancer treatment. This is not an isolated initiative but part of a long-run strategic partnership that both sides have been carefully cultivating. During Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s recent visit to Brasília, the two governments agreed to expand cooperation not only in nuclear energy but also in pharmaceuticals, pointing to a broader alignment on industrial and technological development.

One may recall that Brazil and Russia have been working together in the nuclear field for years. A cooperation agreement was already inked back in 2017, and more recently the agenda has expanded to include small modular reactors (SMRs), floating nuclear plants, and fuel-cycle services. These initiatives align neatly with Brazil’s energy needs and its ambition to diversify away from hydropower dependence, especially in an era of climate volatility.

The timing is crucial. Brazil is expected to decide by mid-year whether to complete the long-delayed Angra 3 nuclear power plant, a project that has become a symbol of both Brazil’s industrial aspirations and its chronic governance bottlenecks. Russian technical expertise, financing models, and fuel-cycle experience could thereby tilt the balance toward completion. The geopolitical significance is hard to miss.

All this is unfolding against the backdrop of Washington’s increasingly assertive posture (to say the least) in the Western Hemisphere. Under President Trump and Secretary of State Rubio, US policy toward Latin America has taken on a neo-Monroeist flavour, with the now so familiar threats, sanctions, and even military actions.

The recent US operation in Venezuela has been particularly destabilizing, prompting sharp reactions across the region and reminding governments of the limits Washington seeks to impose on their strategic autonomy.

In Brazil, these developments have revived an underreported but important debate about national defence and nuclear capability. Analysts such as Larry Kotlikoff and former BRICS New Development Bank vice president Paulo Nogueira Batista have speculated whether Brazil could be “next” on Trump’s hit list.

Brasília, in any case, has been accelerating projects long in gestation even before that: last year, the nuclear-powered submarine program advanced another step. Construction has begun on Brazil’s first nuclear microreactor, and a Brazilian nuclear entity has recently been recognized as an observer organization by the UN.

At the same time, a proposal to develop a Brazilian atomic bomb is circulating in Congress, and the Minister of Mines and Energy has openly argued that nuclear energy should also serve defence purposes. Be as it may, one should not make too much of it. Brazilian law, international treaties, and political culture still impose formidable barriers.

In any case, the Russia–Brazil nuclear partnership has nothing to do with bombs. It is explicitly framed around civilian and peaceful uses, in line with Brazil’s longstanding diplomatic position. Even when defence is involved, as in the nuclear submarine program, the objective is deterrence and technological autonomy rather than weaponization. It is no wonder that Brazil has also sought Russian cooperation in this sensitive area in the past (even under a very pro-American President), as I wrote in 2022.

Thus far, Brasília has also diversified its partnerships, deepening dialogue with China on uranium supply chains and small reactors. From a Latin American perspective, this triangulation, so to speak, among BRICS partners strengthens Brazil’s leverage and reduces vulnerability to external pressure.

The broader implication is clear enough. By reinforcing nuclear cooperation with Russia, Brazil is not drifting toward militarism but asserting its right to technological development within a multipolar order. Still, it is a direct challenge to a US strategy that seeks to police the hemisphere through sanctions and force. For Latin America, the consequences could be profound enough, reshaping energy markets, defence postures, and diplomatic alignments. For BRICS, it reinforces the bloc’s claim to offer real alternatives in strategic sectors.

Washington certainly watches these moves with concern. Yet, from Brasília’s perspective, the logic is straightforward: energy security, technological sovereignty, and multilateral partnerships are indispensable in an increasingly coercive international system. This is the real geopolitical meaning of Brazil’s renewed nuclear dialogue with Russia.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#Brazil #BRICS #DonaldTrump #energy #LatinAmerica #NuclearWeapons #Russia #USA
2026-02-15

Condiţiile puse de #Netanyahu pentru un acord 🇺🇸#SUA-🇮🇷#Iran:Neutralizarea de la programul nuclear 🇮🇷#Iranian şi a rachetelor ce pot lovi 🇮🇱#Israelul.

🔗 wp.me/p9KpFA-56bv

#Știri #NuclearWeapons

R. Scott (i47i) :freebsd_logo:i47i@hachyderm.io
2026-02-14

Merz and Macron respond in Munich to the Trumpist assault: “It is time for a strong Europe”

> Germany and France respond together to Vice President Vance's speech last year. They also open a dialogue on the continent's nuclear protection despite their divergences in other areas

[Spanish]
elpais.com/internacional/2026-
#EU #Germany #France #nuclearweapons #DonaldTrump

The Japan Timesthejapantimes
2026-02-14

For the first time since the Cold War's end, European capitals are discussing how to develop their own nuclear deterrent, sources familiar with the matter say, citing conversations between militaries and governments. japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/02/

The Japan Timesthejapantimes
2026-02-14

The U.S. military is preparing for the possibility of sustained, weekslong operations against Iran if ordered, in what could become a far more serious conflict than previously seen between the countries. japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/02/

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