📢Researchers in Germany & Taiwan—apply to the @dfg_public & #NSTC for funding in eng., humanities & social sciences
đź“…25 Feb 2026
🏷️Know someone who should apply? Like or repost
đź”—For more info https://rxn.mbp-rnc.com/26aaf?utm_source=Mastodon&custom_day=Tuesday
#CallForProposals #ResearchFunding #FundingOpportunity
#NSTC
New #openaccess publication #SciPost #Physics
Lecture notes on normalizing flows for lattice quantum field theories
Miranda C. N. Cheng, Niki Stratikopoulou
SciPost Phys. Lect. Notes 110 (2026)
https://scipost.org/SciPostPhysLectNotes.110
#IoP @UniversityofAmsterdam #InstituteMathematicsAcademiaSinica
#NSTC
Trump’s F-35 Gamble: Saudi-Israeli Normalization As The Key To IMEC’s Return
Trump’s F-35 Gamble: Saudi-Israeli Normalization As The Key To IMEC’s Return
This could make it easier for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel even in the absence of Palestinian independence and thus restore the political viability of this geo-economic megaproject.
The announcement that the US will sell F-35s to Saudi Arabia is a monumental development. Israel is the only country in West Asia to field these cutting-edge fighter jets so its “qualitative military edge” could be eroded as a result, ergo why the IDF officially objected to this. Axios reported that Israel wants the sale conditional on Saudi Arabia normalizing their relations, ideally through the Abraham Accords, or at least the US guaranteeing that the F-35s won’t be deployed in Saudi Arabia’s western regions near Israel.
It remains unclear whether the US will comply with these requests, but what’s much clearer is that Saudi Arabia will occupy a greater role in the US’ regional strategy, which brings the Kingdom back into the US’ orbit after it diversified its partnerships in recent years by expanding ties with Russia and China. Saudi Arabia was already moving towards a rapprochement with the US after the last four years of troubled ties under Biden, however, as proven by its reluctance to formally join BRICS after being invited in 2023.
The latest Gaza War that broke out shortly afterwards, which evolved into the first West Asian War between Israel and the Iranian-led Resistance Axis and ended in the latter’s defeat, derailed progress on the “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor” (IMEC) from that year’s G20. IMEC’s geo-economic scope importantly necessitates the normalization of Israeli-Saudi ties for facilitating this, which the US might now try to broker after ending the Gaza War that disrupted this previously fast-moving process.
Saudi Arabia’s commitment to invest nearly $1 trillion in the US economy, up from the $600 billion that it agreed to during Trump’s visit in May, can be interpreted as a bribe for obtaining the best terms possible. Trump might therefore try to coerce Bibi into at least making superficial concessions on Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank so that Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) doesn’t “lose face” by agreeing to the normalization of their countries’ relations without Palestine first becoming independent.
At the same time, selling F-35s to Saudi Arabia and bestowing it “Major Non-NATO Ally” status might suffice for MBS abandoning even the minimal aforesaid implied demand, especially since IMEC is indispensable to his Kingdom’s post-oil future and associated “Vision 2030” development program. If the US brokers an Israeli-Saudi deal that leads to swift progress being made on implementing IMEC, then it can push IMEC as a replacement for India’s North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) with Iran and Russia.
The US already revoked India’s Chabahar sanctions waiver before reinstating it, correspondingly as a form of pressure amidst their trade talks and then as a goodwill gesture therein as they made progress, but it arguably aims to redirect India from the NSTC to IMEC as a means of containing Russia. After all, the NSTC enables India to help Russia counterbalance the expansion of Turkish influence in Central Asia via TRIPP, so an indefinite waiver is extremely unlikely even in the event of an Indo-US trade deal.
It would be easier for India to accept this geo-economic concession, which might be reciprocated by tariff concessions on the US’ part, if IMEC is once again viable and could thus replace the NSTC. For that to happen, the US must first mediate the normalization of Israeli-Saudi ties, which it might now prioritize after brokering an end to the Gaza War and reaching its latest series of agreements with the Kingdom. The US’ F-35 deal with Saudi Arabia might therefore be part of Trump’s ultimate plan to revive IMEC.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#brics #china #donaldTrump #geopolitics #imec #israel #nstc #saudiArabia #usa
Why Russia And Iran Should Avoid Dependence On Azerbaijan For Logistical And Energy Cooperation
Why Russia And Iran Should Avoid Dependence On Azerbaijan For Logistical And Energy Cooperation
The precedent established by the EU sanctioning Russia under US pressure despite the mutual costs that this entailed discredits the liberal-inspired International Relations theory that complex interdependence between countries is an effective deterrent to future tensions.
Russian, Iranian, and Azerbaijani officials met in Baku last week to discuss trilateral cooperation on transportation and logistics, energy, and customs procedures. Their gathering came just days after the incipient Russian-Azeri rapprochement brought about by Putin apologizing to Ilham Aliyev for last December’s AZAL tragedy during their meeting in Dushanbe. This latest meeting in Baku, which was presumably planned far ahead of the aforesaid, suggests that their ties are back on track.
This could take the form of them making progress on streamlining the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) via the crucial role that would be played by more overland transit through Azerbaijan and possibly even agreeing upon a role for it in facilitating summer 2024’s Russian-Iranian gas swap MoU. In both cases, however, it might not be wise for Russia and Iran to put all their proverbial eggs in Azerbaijan’s basket given that they only just overcame their recently troubled ties with it.
As regards Russia’s, the Kremlin was incensed after Azerbaijan charged some of its nationals with espionage upon shuttering Baku’s Sputnik branch, which preceded Aliyev replacing Putin with Trump for mediating talks with Armenia that then led to the US replacing Russia’s role in the “Zangezur Corridor”. The “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), as it’ll now be called, could dangerously lead to a massive injection of Western influence into Central Asia via NATO member Turkiye.
Iran’s recent trouble with Azerbaijan was even more serious after some there accused it of allowing Israel to use their airspace during this summer’s 12-day war. Armenia’s de facto subordination as a joint Azeri-Turkish client state via TRIPP and consequent turbocharging of regional Turkic nationalism also made some fear an impending renewal of Azeri separatism in Northern Iran. Iran’s ethnic Azeri President Masoud Pezeshkian doesn’t share these concerns, however, hence why tensions soon abated.
Considering the seriousness of Russia’s and Iran’s recently troubled ties with Azerbaijan, they shouldn’t become dependent on it for logistical and energy cooperation in case their respective rapprochements are derailed in the future for whatever reason, including third-party influence over Azerbaijan. In that scenario, Azerbaijan’s roles could be weaponized to blackmail them or inflict serious damage to their strategic interests, hence why this should be avoided so as to not give Baku such enormous leverage.
To that end, continuing to develop trade across the Caspian and the NSTC’s eastern (Turkmen-Kazakh) branch could preemptively avert logistical dependence on Azerbaijan, while a gas pipeline across the latter route could complement one across Azerbaijan or replace Baku’s role in their energy ties entirely. Of course, Russian-Iranian logistical and energy cooperation across Azerbaijan is cheaper and quicker, but the long-term strategic costs described above also make it very risky in case ties once again sour.
Some of their officials, policymakers, and influencers might claim that reliance on Azerbaijan will foster complex interdependence among them for deterring future tensions by raising the mutual costs thereof, but this school of thought was discredited by the EU sanctioning Russia under US pressure. The lesson that Russia painfully learned through the previously mentioned precedent of pinning its hopes on such liberal-inspired International Relations theories makes it less likely to repeat this mistake with Azerbaijan.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#Armenia #Azerbaijan #EU #Iran #NorthSouthTransportCorridor #NSTC #Russia #Turkey
Iran Hopes That CPEC Branding Will Secure More Investment From China
Iran Hopes That CPEC Branding Will Secure More Investment From China
Rebranding existing logistics corridors across its territory as part of CPEC is a means to this end.
Iran’s Mehr News Agency and others reported that one of their country’s leading economic officials discussed the possibility of it facilitating Pakistan’s trade with Russia and Europe at a meeting with his counterpart during President Pezeshkian’s visit in early August. Mehr wrote that “[he] said the establishment of a joint free trade zone and linking the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) through Iran to Russia and Europe could be put on the agenda of Tehran-Islamabad trade relations.”
Russia and Pakistan plan to launch a delayed freight train pilot project later this month for connecting their economies via Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, but this route represents the eastern branch of the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC), not CPEC. By branding it as an expansion of CPEC, Pakistan hopes to revive international interest in this somewhat stalled series of Chinese megaprojects, all while misleading India into thinking that Russia is participating in these controversial investments.
Delhi objects to CPEC since it transits through Pakistani-controlled disputed territory that India claims as its own. Seeing as how “Russia’s Neutrality During The Latest Indo-Pak Conflict Was Due To New Policymaking Dynamics”, chiefly the rise of the pro-BRI policymaking faction, some in India might fall for Pakistan’s infowar provocation that Russia is now participating in CPEC. Nevertheless, India will need to rely on Russia more than ever if ties with the US worsen, so no policy changes are expected on its part.
In any case, considering that Russia has hitherto eschewed any connection with CPEC due to India’s sensitivities, the objective reality of it not directly participating in any tangible (as in Chinese-financed) expansion of CPEC in Iran should inevitably alleviate whatever concerns some Indians might have. The same can’t be said for Iran, however, which is openly associating itself with CPEC branding even though the NSTC infrastructure is already in place for facilitating Pakistani trade with Russia via its territory.
This suggests that Iran hopes to procure Chinese investments on the pretext of its prospectively formal involvement in CPEC regardless of whether or not these actually facilitate Pakistani-Russian trade. From China’s perspective, even Iran’s symbolic involvement in CPEC (such as the branding that Chinese projects might use within the country even if they’re not connected to the actual CPEC) could raise China’s regional prestige even further, thus possibly leading to other countries following suit.
Neither China nor Pakistan will ever officially admit it, but CPEC has been a disappointment after it fizzled out in recent years and didn’t approach anywhere near the game-changing impact that was widely expected of it a decade ago, hence the importance for both of their reputations in changing this. Roping Iran into at least agreeing to allow this branding to be used for Chinese investments and Pakistani-connected trade is a means to the end of reviving international interest in CPEC.
Iran was hit very hard by Israel during their brief 12-day war so it’s unimaginable that the country would turn down any opportunity to attract more foreign investment into its economy. Accordingly, by proposing the conceptual expansion of CPEC westward en route to Russia and Europe, Pakistan got Iran to go along with this branding in pursuit of the aforesaid imperative. Iran’s newfound embrace of CPEC, in contrast to Russia’s continued distancing from it, might complicate ties with India in the future.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management
#China #CPEC #Europe #India #Iran #NorthSouthTransportCorridor #NSTC #Pakistan #Russia
The PAKAFUZ Railway Through Central Eurasia Is Making Slow But Steady Progress
The PAKAFUZ Railway Through Central Eurasia Is Making Slow But Steady Progress
Five issues must first be overcome in order for this project to become a reality.
The Russian and Uzbek Transport Ministries agreed earlier in the month to begin practical implementation of the Trans-Afghan Railway project, also known as the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan (PAKAFUZ) railway, by carrying out feasibility studies. They also plan to hold talks with members of Pakistan Railways and Afghan representatives during the next Russia-Islamic World Forum in Kazan in mid-May. These developments represent slow but nevertheless steady progress on this project.
The goal is to pioneer a new Central Eurasian Corridor for expanding trade between Russia and South Asia, all while enabling the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan to profit accordingly from facilitating this route, though not much has been accomplished in recent years due to five issues.
- The first is that Afghan-Pakistani tensions have raised concern about this project’s viability since either might close off transit to the other as leverage and thus disrupt inter-regional trade for everyone else.
- The second issue is that ISIS-K remains a threat inside Afghanistan just like allegedly Taliban-backed terrorists are an increasing threat inside Pakistan, which could lead to these groups targeting cargoes along this railway and even hijacking them just like Baloch separatists recently did to the Jaffar Express.
- Third, US sanctions on Russia and Afghanistan remain a formidable economic obstacle since these could be weaponized for political reasons to pressure companies against utilizing this route for trade.
- The fourth issue is that Russia is prioritizing financing its special operation while Pakistan is financially struggling so it might be difficult to raise the funds for financing this estimated $4.6-8.2 billion project.
- And finally, although circuitous and also subject to US sanctions, the already existing North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) through Iran could emerge as a viable alternative to PAKAFUZ if Iran and the US reach a comprehensive deal over the nuclear issue that involves phased sanctions relief.
Nevertheless, the political will does indeed exist among all parties to at least have all the plans in place for constructing PAKAFUZ in case the aforementioned five issues are overcome in the future, hence why Russia, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan will discuss this project during next month’s forum. Russia remains committed to it no matter what since this route could one day connect to India if there’s ever a breakthrough in relations with Pakistan (however difficult that is to imagine right now after Pahalgam).
To briefly elaborate, India and Pakistan might be more willing to mutually compromise on disputed Kashmir by agreeing to formalize the Line of Control between their respective parts of this territory as the international border, which could then unlock the aforesaid and other economic opportunities. Not only would both objectively benefit, but so too would the US, which has a strategic interest in India more effectively balancing China’s economic influence in Central Asia via PAKAFUZ.
The challenge though is in getting Pakistan’s de facto military rulers to agree to this since they’d no longer be able to exploit this conflict for legitimizing their control over the country, ergo why the America First faction reportedly wants civilian-led democratic rule there as a means to this end. Even if PAKAFUZ never connects to India because the Kashmir Conflict remains unresolved, this project would still accelerate multipolar processes in Eurasia upon completion, it’ll just fall short of its full potential.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management
#Afghanistan #Eurasia #NSTC #Pakistan #Russia #SouthAsia #Uzbekistan
New #openaccess publication #SciPost #Physics #Codebases
The Cytnx library for tensor networks
Kai-Hsin Wu, Chang-Teng Lin, Ke Hsu, Hao-Ti Hung, Manuel Schneider, Chia-Min Chung, Ying-Jer Kao, Pochung Chen
Paper:
SciPost Phys. Codebases 53 (2025)
https://scipost.org/SciPostPhysCodeb.53
Cytnx v1.0:
SciPost Phys. Codebases 53-r1.0 (2025)
https://scipost.org/SciPostPhysCodeb.53-r1.0
New #openaccess publication #SciPost #Physics Core
Phase transitions from heating to non-heating in SU(1,1) quantum dynamics: Applications to Bose-Einstein condensates and periodically driven coupled oscillators
Heng-Hsi Li, Po-Yao Chang
SciPost Phys. Core 8, 018 (2025)
https://scipost.org/SciPostPhysCore.8.1.018
The Russian-Iranian Partnership Might Be A Game-Changer, But Only For Gas, Not Geopolitics
The Russian-Iranian Partnership Might Be A Game-Changer, But Only For Gas, Not Geopolitics
The future of their strategic partnership is bright, but in order to fully appreciate its prospects, observers must acknowledge its non-military nature instead of continuing to fantasize about a joint war against Israel and/or the US like some are doing.
The Russian and Iranian presidents met in Moscow last Friday to sign an updated strategic partnership pact that can be read in full here and was reviewed here. The run-up to this development was marked by predictable hype about it being a game-changer, which hasn’t subsided in the days since, but this is an inaccurate description of what they agreed to. The only way in which this might ring true is with regards to gas, not geopolitics, for the reasons that’ll now be explained.
To begin with, Russia and Iran already had close military-technical cooperation before they updated their strategic partnership last week as proven by the rumours of Russia relying on Iranian drones in Ukraine. They also agreed to revive the previously stillborn North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) shortly after the special operation began and the West imposed unprecedented sanctions against Moscow. Therefore, these parts of their updated strategic partnership aren’t anything new, they just aim to strengthen them.
About that, this agreement is fundamentally different from last summer’s Russian-North Korean one in that there aren’t any mutual defence obligations as clarified in Article 3. They only committed to not aid any aggression against the other, including assistance to the aggressor, and to help settle the subsequent conflict at the UN. That was already the case in their relations so explicitly clarifying it is redundant. Under no circumstances will Russia go to war against Israel and/or the US in support of Iran.
After all, “Russia Dodged A Bullet By Wisely Choosing Not To Ally With The Now-Defeated Resistance Axis” over the past 15 months as Israel single-handedly destroyed that Iranian-led regional network, so it naturally follows that it won’t risk World War III in defence of an even weaker Iran. Moreover, Russia didn’t risk war with either of them amidst last December’s American- and Turkish-backed regime change in Syria, not to mention the ongoing special operation where it has direct national security interests.
Putin is therefore very unlikely to break from this precedent, which observers can confidently conclude by dint of him declining to include any North Korean-like mutual defence obligations in Russia’s updated strategic partnership pact with Iran, which should hopefully put to rest some folks’ wishful thinking. It should also be said that the timing of this document’s signing is important too since it took place after Israel defeated the Resistance Axis and as the region correspondingly enters a new geopolitical era.
The parties had been negotiating their updated pact for several years already, and while work had finally ended last fall, Putin specifically requested during the Kazan Summit that Pezeshkian “pay a separate visit to our country to sign this document and other important documents in a ceremonial atmosphere.” Some at the time casually dismissed this as some form of protocol, but in retrospect, it’s arguably the case that Russia didn’t want to sign such a partnership pact until regional hostilities finally abated.
That’s understandable too since he foresaw that the West and some in Israel would interpret that development as supposedly being aimed against them, with the resultant spin complicating any potential peace talks over Ukraine and risking a crisis in relations with Israel. Putin remains committed to resolving the NATO-Russian security dilemma over Ukraine through diplomatic means and spent the past quarter-century expanding ties with Israel so he wasn’t going to jeopardize either in this way.
From the Iran side, Pezeshkian represents the “reformist”/“moderate” faction of the Iranian policymaking elite, and they too might have been concerned that this development would be interpreted by the West and some in Israel as being aimed against them. Such perceptions could spoil any chance of reviving nuclear talks with the US, and it was still uncertain who the next American President would be, so he and his ilk might have also calculated that it’s better to wait until regional hostilities finally abated.
Observers will note that Pezeshkian gave his first interview to foreign media since the US presidential election just days before traveling to Moscow, during which time he reaffirmed his intent to resume talks with the US. The timing strongly suggests that he wanted to preemptively counteract whatever spin hawkish elements in the new administration might try to put on his country’s updated strategic partnership pact with Russia. This might have even been coordinated with Russia to a degree too.
Moving along to the NSTC component of their updated strategic partnership pact, it’s much more substantive since the aim is to increase their measly $4 billion mutual trade, which will help Russia more easily reach other Global South markets while providing relief for Iran’s sanctions-beleaguered economy. If successful, and it’ll take some time to see either way, then the NSTC can serve as a new geo-economic axis connecting the Eurasian Heartland to West Asia, South Asia, and eventually ASEAN and East Africa.
Once again, these plans were already underway for almost three years before they finally signed their long-negotiated updated strategic partnership pact so none of this is exactly new, it just bears mentioning in the larger context considering that part of this newly signed document concerns the NSTC. Much more important than the military and connectivity parts by far is their ambitious gas plans since Russia and Iran have some of the world’s largest reserves, with the latter’s largely remaining untapped.
It was explained in late August why “Russia Might Soon Redirect Its Gas Pipeline Plans From China To Iran & India”, namely due to the continued pricing dispute with the People’s Republic over Power of Siberia 2 and the latest gas MoUs at the time with Iran and then Azerbaijan. These combined to create the credible possibility of Russia replacing its hitherto eastward export focus with a southward one instead. Their updated strategic partnership pact confirms that the southern direction is now Russia’s priority.
Putin said during his press conference with Pezeshkian that he envisages beginning exports at just 2 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year, presumably due to the lack of infrastructure in northern Iran, before eventually scaling it to 55 bcm. That’s the same capacity as the now-defunct Nord Stream 1 to the EU. His Energy Minister later told reporters that the route will run through Azerbaijan and that negotiations are in their final stages over pricing. Their successful conclusion would revolutionize the industry.
Russian investment and technology could unlock Iran’s enormous gas reserves, thus leading to those two creating a “gas OPEC” for managing global prices amidst the Islamic Republic’s entrance to the market. While they have a self-interested incentive to keep them high, plunging the price could deal a powerful blow to America’s fracking industry and its associated LNG exports, thus imperilling its newfound European market dominance brought about by sanctions, the Nord Stream terrorist attack, and Ukraine.
Additionally, Russian gas projects on Iran’s side of the Gulf could supply nearby India, and/or a swap arrangement could be agreed to whereby Iran provides gas to it on Russia’s behalf even sooner. For that to happen, however, India would have to defy existing US sanctions on Iran or secure a waiver. Trump 2.0 might be convinced to respectively turn a blind eye or extend such in order for India to purchase this gas instead of China, the latter of which is already defying such sanctions on the import of Iranian oil.
Part of Trump 2.0’s expected “Pivot (back) to Asia” is to obtain predominant influence over China’s energy imports, which includes cutting off its supply through a carrot-and-stick approach of incentivizing exporters to sell to other clients instead and creating obstacles for those that don’t. Some possibilities for how this could look with regards to Russia were explained here in early January, while the Iranian dimension could work as described above, albeit in exchange for US-Iranian talks making progress.
Even if India decides not to risk the US’ wrath by unilaterally importing Russian-produced Iranian gas in the event that Trump 2.0 isn’t convinced about the merits of having it replace China as Iran’s top energy client and thus threatens harsh sanctions, then China can just buy it all instead. Either way, Russia’s help in unlocking Iran’s largely untapped and enormous reserves will have a seismic effect on this industry, with the only questions being what prices they agree to and who’ll purchase most of it.
The answer to both is of immense importance for American interests since constantly low prices could kill its fracking industry and inevitably lead to the loss of its newly captured European market while China’s large-scale import of this resource (let alone on the cheap) could further fuel its superpower rise. It’s therefore in the US’ interests to boldly consider coordinating with the potentially forthcoming Russian-Iranian “gas OPEC” as well as allowing India to replace China as Iran’s top energy client.
Circling back to the headline, it’s indeed the case that the updated Russian-Iranian strategic partnership pact is poised to be much more of a game-changer in the global gas industry than for geopolitics, though its revolutionary impact on the aforesaid could have some geopolitical consequences in time. Even so, the point is that the pact isn’t geopolitically driven like some enthusiasts imagined before its signing and others still counterfactually insist afterwards since Russia won’t defend Iran from Israel or the US.
Russia and Iran “reject unipolarity and hegemony in world affairs” as agreed upon in their newly signed pact, but they’re not going to directly oppose it via joint military means, only indirectly via energy-related ones and by strengthening their economies’ resilience. The future of their strategic partnership is bright, but in order to fully appreciate its prospects, observers must acknowledge its non-military nature instead of continuing to fantasize about a joint war against Israel and/or the US like some are doing.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
New #openaccess publication #SciPost #Physics Core
Entanglement Hamiltonian and effective temperature of non-Hermitian quantum spin ladders
Pei-Yun Yang, Yu-Chin Tzeng
SciPost Phys. Core 7, 074 (2024)
https://scipost.org/SciPostPhysCore.7.4.074
New #openaccess publication #SciPost #Physics
Efficient higher-order matrix product operators for time evolution
Maarten Van Damme, Jutho Haegeman, Ian McCulloch, Laurens Vanderstraeten
SciPost Phys. 17, 135 (2024)
https://scipost.org/SciPostPhys.17.5.135
New #openaccess publication #SciPost #Physics
Boundary condition and reflection anomaly in 2+1 dimensions
Jiunn-Wei Chen, Chang-Tse Hsieh, Ryutaro Matsudo
SciPost Phys. 17, 068 (2024)
https://scipost.org/SciPostPhys.17.2.068
Indoor air quality impact on viral transmission | Chief Scientist https://www.chiefscientist.gov.au/news-and-media/indoor-air-quality-impact-viral-transmission “The National Science and Technology Council (#NSTC) has released a new report on the impact of #IndoorAirQuality on the transmission of #airborne #viral diseases in public buildings and strategies to reduce transmission.
Thanks @PieterPeach for the heads up.
Key findings: (1/4)
Wächst Silicon Saxony zum Silicon Middle Europe? Zusätzlich zu den Fabrikplänen von Intel und TSMC in Magdeburg, Dresden und Breslau baut Taiwan nun noch eine Chipdesigner-Ausbildung in Prag auf
https://oiger.de/2024/04/16/taiwan-richtet-chipdesign-ausbildung-in-prag-ein/190567
#Chipdesign #Ausbildung #Fachkräfte #IC #Schaltkreisentwurf #Taiwan #Regierung #TSMC #Intel #NSTC #Sachsen #Schlesien #Böhmen #Prag #Dresden
Taiwan Wants First Domestically Produced Quantum Computer by 2027 https://thequantuminsider.com/?p=2360086 #Quantum_Computing_Business #Academia_Sinica #Amazon #IBM #IQM #Ministry_of_Economic_Affairs #NSTC #Taiwan #quantumdaily Insider Brief Taiwan announced its goal to produce the nation’s first domestically developed quantum computer by 2027. The nation’s scientific leaders see quantum computing as a keystone project in developing future global tech landscapes. Taiwan has succeeded in connect
"Die Nationale #Weltraum-Organisation (National Space Organization, #NSPO) wurde am 1. Januar dieses Jahres in #Taiwan-Weltraumbehörde (Taiwan Space Agency, #TASA) umbenannt, was zu den laufenden Bemühungen der Regierung der Republik China (Taiwan) gehört, die globale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Landes bei Weltraumforschung zu verbessern, teilte der Nationale Wissenschafts- und Technologie-Rat (National Science and Technology Council, #NSTC) mit."
4.1.2023
Client Info
Server: https://mastodon.social
Version: 2025.07
Repository: https://github.com/cyevgeniy/lmst