#certificatetransparency

2025-05-15

I submitted a PR to fix a crash on startup for certstream-server github.com/CaliDog/certstream- #certificatetransparency

Hacker Newsh4ckernews
2025-03-01
2024-12-03

Currently trying to understand Chrome / Chromimum #CertificateTransparency Policy and why no-sct.badssl.com/ loads without NET::ERR_CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_REQUIRED in chrome/chromium, contrary to what it did before (ex github.com/brave/brave-browser)

Pass the SALT Conferencepassthesaltcon@infosec.exchange
2024-05-24

Today, our #WebPKI session 😍

If you weren't sleeping during the last decade, you know that @letsencrypt and #CertificateTransparency (CT) have revolutionized web security ⚡️

#pts24 will welcome no less than:
- Aaron Gabble, #techlead at @letsencrypt
- Philippe Boneff, #techlead of #Google CT team
- and an offensive research by Kévin Schouteeten & Paul Barbé from #Synacktiv on certs issuance in managed K8s env.

IMHO, you shouldn't miss this session!
👉 REGISTER pretix.eu/passthesalt/2024/

Futuristic Robert [KJ5ELX] :donor:0xF21D@infosec.exchange
2024-04-21

Playing around with CT logging and found this. Lots of certificates registered every minute for the domain "dyingbirds.com". There's a hex string followed by a numeric value then .amdv.dyingbirds.com.

#pki #certificatetransparency

Example output from certstream: 

[INFO:certstream] 2024-04-21 15:03:05,909 - Connection established to CertStream! Listening for events...
[2024-04-21T15:03:05.943430] https://ct.googleapis.com/logs/us1/argon2024/ - f379c60a8d9409fa0e86b68dfebf5ea1713729701784.amdv.dyingbirds.com 
[2024-04-21T15:03:06.020989] https://ct.googleapis.com/logs/us1/argon2024/ - fec77024502447fb9451ca064b318801713729661175.amdv.dyingbirds.com 
[2024-04-21T15:03:06.144583] https://ct.googleapis.com/logs/us1/argon2024/ - 5b232ad80024e92919e8b6cf75f47771713729685252.amdv.dyingbirds.com 
[2024-04-21T15:03:06.755954] https://ct.googleapis.com/logs/us1/argon2024/ - 9bae046771943abb26a3b8721a89a5f1713729712441.amdv.dyingbirds.com 
[2024-04-21T15:03:07.465497] https://ct.googleapis.com/logs/us1/argon2024/ - 4c086c553354475ae29c2b58786105c1713729683003.amdv.dyingbirds.com 
[2024-04-21T15:03:07.810608] https://ct.googleapis.com/logs/us1/argon2024/ - c1a2bd18abf470d8b54fb523bb390a21713729701652.amdv.dyingbirds.com 
[2024-04-21T15:03:07.827800] https://ct.googleapis.com/logs/us1/argon2024/ - 856b08b104244c791ebae9c57042cfa1713729663372.amdv.dyingbirds.com
2024-03-30

Furthermore produced software artifacts proofs are written into a database similar to #certificateTransparency.

We have recently implemented this in #PrivateBin and it works great: github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateB

Of course practically, people (especially software consumers) needed to verify it, to be worth the work.

Obviously, it's no magic bullet. It just raises the burden for an attacker. Obviously, the source code repo could be made to contain bad code, but you cannot anymore tamper at built-time.

2024-03-24

Anyone else just getting 502s when using crt.sh, searching for CT logs on domain names?

The index page works, although I'd argue with degraded performance. Any search on the site however does not.

Can someone confirm? Or is it just me?

#downdetector #crt.sh #certificatetransparency #ctlogs

J.C. ☕/🦊/🛩️coffee@mastodon.sandwich.net
2024-03-14

Filippo has announced the #Sunlight #CertificateTransparency log design on ct-policy #CT groups.google.com/a/chromium.o

Let's Encrypt has also announced adopting Sunlight for new logs that we hope will be more scalable and dramatically less expensive: Sycamore, Willow, and our new test log, Twig: letsencrypt.org/2024/03/14/int

J.C. ☕/🦊/🛩️coffee@mastodon.sandwich.net
2024-03-14

I'll be attending the Real World Crypto Symposium in Toronto in two weeks time (#RWC), and after that, I'm once again co-organizing the Open Source Cryptography Workshop. (#OSCW2024)

I’ll also be real happy to talk about the new developments with the #Sunlight #CertificateTransparency log design, Let’s Encrypt’s new ACME Renewal Information (#ARI) draft specification, #CRLite, Rustls… all that stuff.

insufficient.coffee/2024/03/14

Danny :archlinux:​deliverance@infosec.exchange
2023-12-31

@mmeier And for anyone who wants to move away from wildcard certs and use actual hostnames, just be aware of #certificatetransparency . While it's overall a healthy thing for the internet, you could end up giving any would-be attacker a list of subdomains in your #homelab.

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certif

Alexandre Dulaunoyadulau@infosec.exchange
2023-12-30

Recently I was digging in the outliers of DNS resolving from the certificate transparency and there is a hostname which is often hardcoded test.microsoftpki.net but which is giving a NXDOMAIN. Checking the Passive DNS, the domain itself exists and seems to be registered on Microsoft infrastructure

Any clue of the software or service at Microsoft generating certificate with an invalid domain for testing?

#passivedns #dns #certificatetransparency

{"rrtype": "NS", "rrname”: "ns3-04.azure-dns.org", "rdata”: "microsoftpki.net’, "count’: 1, "time_first': 1702557757, "time_last": 1703485995, "origin”: "https://waw.circl.lu/pdns/"}

{'rrtype": "NS", "rrname”: "ns1-04.azure-dns.con", "rdata": "microsoftpki.net’, "count': 1, "time_first': 1702557757, "time_last": 1703485995, "origin”: "https://ww.circl.lu/pdns/"}

{"rrtype": "NS", "rrname”: "nsd-04.azure-dns.info’, "rdata": "microsoftpki.net’, "count’: 1, "time_first': 1702557757, "time_last": 1703485995, "origin": "https://wa.circl.lu/pdns/"}

{'rrtype": "NS", "rrname": "ns2-04.azure-dns.net", "rdata": "microsoftpki.net", "count’: 1, "time_first': 1762557757, "time last": 1703485995, "origin”: "https://ww.circl.lu/pdns/"}

{"rrtype": "TXT", "rrname”: "v=DHARCL; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:d@rua.agari.com; ruf=mailto:d@ruf.agari.com; fo=1", "rdata”: 'microsoftpki.net’, "count': 1, "time first': 1702557757, "time last": 1703927772, "origin": "https://wa.circl.lu/pdns/"} {"rrtype": "SOA". "rrname": "ns1-84.azure-dns.com azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com 1 3600 380 2419200 360", "rdata": "microsoftpki.net”, "count”: 1, "time_first": 1782557757, "time_last": 1703927819, "origin": "https://www.circl.lu/pdns/"}
Daniel Molkentindanimo@chaos.social
2023-11-08

The #EU has reached an agreement on #eIDAS, rolling back the state of Internet security by 12 years, and by forcing browser vendors / root store operators to include government Root CA, disallowing #CertificateTransparency and making it illegal to fix (unless you can influence #ETSI, which is conveniently government friendly when it comes to surveillance).

This is bad. Really bad. It enables surveillance.

Technical background: scotthelme.co.uk/what-the-qwac

Colin Cogle 🔵colincogle
2023-10-26

@jabberati @jssfr @aslmx @debacle Thank you for complaining! I had no idea did this. I have many of my corporate clients on there. I’ll have to pay more attention to crt.sh

2023-10-21

@chrysn That's an intersting worthwhile take. One thing I learned from this, is the advanced CAA configuration.
But from a usabilty perspective, strict #CertificateTransparency monitoring is probably the easier solution.

2023-07-17
Antonis Charitonantonis
2023-07-02

In case you missed it, here's my talk with Phil Porada from @letsencrypt on about and operating this critical internet infrastructure:

youtube.com/watch?v=B1Y9WOqiEYw

heise onlineheiseonline
2022-12-02

Wordpress: Attackiert schon während der Installation

Noch bevor das System live geht, haben Angreifer es oft unbemerkt mit Hintertüren versehen. Die stehen nämlich schon nach wenigen Minuten auf der Matte.

heise.de/news/Wordpress-Attack

2019-06-24

Pro tip: Monitor your LE certificates using Atom feeds:

Just subscribe to: crt.sh/atom?q=<domain you want to watch goes here>

And get all issued certificates for that domain right to your feed reader. Great and useful service with interesting results.

By the way, it might also be a good point to start using the `expect-ct` header:

scotthelme.co.uk/a-new-securit

#CertificateTransparency #infosec #monitoring #CA #certificates

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