#keytrap

Stéphane Bortzmeyerbortzmeyer@mastodon.gougere.fr
2024-11-07

Proposal to add hard numerical limits to the #DNS parameters, in order to limit DoS attacks like #KeyTrap, Infinite or #Tsuname

For instance, max. number of NS records : 13, max. number of DNSSEC keys: 6, max. length of the CNAME chain: 1 (3 for the sissies), etc.

#IETF121

@x_cli

2024-03-27

op SIDN.nl: Alle DNS-software en -diensten bleken kwetsbaar voor DoS-aanval -- 25 jaar oude kwetsbaarheid in DNSSEC-ontwerp afgelopen weken gepatcht
sidn.nl/nieuws-en-blogs/alle-d

"De kwetsbaarheid met de naam #KeyTrap maakte het mogelijk om vanaf een DNS-server een Denial-of-Service (DoS)-aanval uit te voeren op een validerende resolver. Omdat het een probleem in de specificatie zelf betrof, waren alle veelgebruikte DNS-resolvers en -diensten aangedaan."

#DNSSEC #InternetSecurity

Stéphane Bortzmeyerbortzmeyer@mastodon.gougere.fr
2024-03-19

Le 16 février a été publiée la faille de sécurité #DNSSEC #KeyTrap Je sais, c'est un peu tard pour en parler mais c'est quand même utile, non ?

bortzmeyer.org/keytrap.html

Stéphane Bortzmeyerbortzmeyer@mastodon.gougere.fr
2024-03-16

Very good analogy by Edward Lewis on an #IETF mailing list (in the context of #KeyTrap) about the risk of filtering stuff in the name of security: filtering can also clog the system. "I am picturing a screen put over a water spillway, or paper air
filters in an HVAC intake or internal combustion engines." "Filtering will slow flow and may even entirely stop it"

Stéphane Bortzmeyerbortzmeyer@mastodon.gougere.fr
2024-03-12

@dad Ah, j'avais prévu d'écrire un article sur #KeyTrap en français mais j'ai eu la flemme. Ceci dit, il n'est pas trop tard.

yukoffyukoff
2024-03-01
Stéphane Bortzmeyerbortzmeyer@mastodon.gougere.fr
2024-02-23

Si vous ne savez pas quoi lire ce week-end, que vous vous intéressez au #DNS, et que vous n'avez pas encore lu l'article sur #KeyTrap, il est bien. Il faut juste ignorer les phrases du genre « Solving these issues fundamentally requires to
reconsider the basics of the design philosophy of the Internet. » et autres exagérations typiques d'Haya Shulman. athene-center.de/en/keytrap

(Avant, pensez à mettre à jour vos résolveurs.)

BmixedBmixed
2024-02-23


The KeyTrap Denial-of-Service Algorithmic Complexity Attacks On DNS ≈ Packet Storm
packetstormsecurity.com/files/

BmixedBmixed
2024-02-22
2024-02-20

edgerouters (running dnsmasq) still haven't provided update firmware for #keytrap #dnssec #Ubiquiti

2024-02-20

Looks like @sans_isc picked up on an exploit for KeyTrap - I haven't tested it yet, and it is explicitly documented as being defanged, but looks legit on the surface:

github.com/knqyf263/CVE-2023-5

Added to my roll-up post.

#keytrap #nsec3 #CVE202350387 #CVE_2023_50387
#dns #dnssec

2024-02-16
"Since the initial disclosure of the vulnerabilities on November 2, 2023, we have been working with all major vendors on mitigating the problems in their implementations."

"We recommend that everyone installs the patches and updates their DNS software. We recommend to continue using DNSSEC, encourage the domains to get signed, and all the resolvers to enforce DNSSEC validation. DNSSEC is the only practical measure to block DNS cache poisoning attacks."

https://labs.ripe.net/author/haya-shulman/keytrap-algorithmic-complexity-attacks-exploit-fundamental-design-flaw-in-dnssec/

#DNSSEC #DNS #KEYTRAP
2024-02-15

You may have seen talk of the "#KeyTrap" #DNSSEC vulnerability in the last few days, with patches pushed for e.g., bind, unbound, knot, etc. in a well coordinated effort across the #DNS community and industry.

In a nutshell: you could DoS a validating resolver by causing it to perform excessive expensive signature validations.

The research team has now published the technical paper:
athene-center.de/fileadmin/con

ISC has a good summary here:
isc.org/blogs/2024-bind-securi

deltatux :donor:deltatux@infosec.town
2024-02-15

Researchers from the National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity in Germany have disclosed a critical flaw in the way DNSSEC was designed and dubbed it "KeyTrap".

Essentially, the "KeyTrap" flaw allows an attacker to use a specially crafted DNS packet to cause a denial-of-service on the targeted DNSSEC-validating DNS server.

Since the flaw exists in the DNSSEC standard itself, it affects all major DNS server implementations like BIND9, Unbound, Microsoft DNS and etc. All public resolvers like Google DNS and Cloudflare DNS are also affected.

For more:
www.athene-center.de/en/news/press/key-trap & infosec.exchange/@tychotithonus/111924626712765292

#infosec #cybersecurity #dnssec #DNS #KeyTrap #DoS #DenialofService

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