#AfghanTaliban

2025-04-19

WaPo’s Report About Terrorists’ Use Of US-Sourced Afghan Arms Against Pakistan Is Misleading

WaPo’s Report About Terrorists’ Use Of US-Sourced Afghan Arms Against Pakistan Is Misleading

By Andrew Korybko

The Pakistani Establishment shares some blame for the latest terrorist upsurge together with America and the Taliban to differing degrees, yet WaPo avoided drawing attention to this for reasons that can only be speculated.

The Washington Post (WaPo) published a detailed report last week about how “U.S. weapons from Afghan war give Pakistani militants a deadly advantage”, which claimed that some of the US-designated terrorists behind last month’s hijacking of the Jaffar Express used such arms during this infamous attack. They allegedly obtained them from the Taliban and the Pakistani borderland bazaars where they’ve supposedly been sold for the last 3,5 years. There’s no reason to doubt any of the three aforesaid claims.

What’s misleading though is the subtext throughout the piece that these American arms and the Taliban alone are responsible for the upsurge in terrorism across Pakistan. Weapons don’t cause terrorism, people do, either because bad actors exploit their poverty, they’re ideologically radicalized, and/or bent on revenge due to personal disputes, their family having been harmed or killed, or real or perceived injustices. None of this justifies terrorism, to be absolutely clear, but it contextualizes the root causes.

They’re not even remotely touched upon by WaPo, however, with it simply being taken for granted that terrorist attacks are occurring for whatever reason. Their report also only makes casual mention of how Pakistan was once accused of sheltering Taliban leaders, which is deliberately deceitful because it was also actually accused of arming the Taliban and facilitating the then-insurgent group’s logistics. The Taliban couldn’t have returned to power without Pakistan’s help over the two decades prior.

These facts don’t imply that Pakistan expected the Taliban to then arm anti-Pakistani terrorists for ideological and strategic reasons even though some earlier warned about that possibility, nor that Pakistan deserves what happened, but reminding readers about them more fairly divides the blame. On that topic, WaPo also didn’t question how so many arms were able to be smuggled into Pakistan despite Islamabad knowing what the Taliban captured, nor why they were sold openly in bazaars for so long.

These observations lead to the uncomfortable conclusion that the Pakistani Establishment, which refers to the country’s powerful armed forces and intelligence services that wield much more control over policy than the civilian government, is either incompetent and/or corrupt. They’ve practically sealed the border shut with India so much so that rarely does anything get through to Pakistan without their knowledge, however, so incompetence probably isn’t the issue.

Corruption is therefore the most logistical conclusion and it’s proven to have very serious national security consequences in the sense of facilitating, but importantly not being directly responsible for, the recent upsurge in terrorism since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan. Elaborating on this, some officials might have been bribed to let these arms illegally enter Pakistan while others could have wanted to profit from these sales, but the Establishment could have put a quick stop to this if it really wanted to.

This didn’t happen even after signs of an impending terrorist upsurge were seen from mid-2022 onward, which coincides with them redirecting their institutions’ focus towards suppressing the political opposition instead of remaining committed to ensuring their country’s national security interests. The Pakistani Establishment therefore shares some blame for this together with America and the Taliban to differing degrees, yet WaPo avoided drawing attention to that for reasons that can only be speculated.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #Pakistan #PakistanArmy #TehrikITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #Terrorists #TTP #USA

2025-03-11

Trump’s Strategic Ambitions In Afghanistan: Challenges And Implications For US-Pakistan Relations

Trump’s Strategic Ambitions In Afghanistan: Challenges And Implications For US-Pakistan Relations

By Andrew Korybko

Geographic reasons make this a practical necessity if he wants to restore the US’ military presence at Bagram Airbase and/or return some of the equipment that Biden left there during the withdrawal.

Trump surprised many when he recently declared that he wants to restore the US’ military presence at Afghanistan’s Bagram Airbase and return some of the equipment that Biden left during the withdrawal. He justified the first on the basis that it’s just one hour away from where China makes (likely meaning bases) its nuclear weapons and claimed that it now allegedly occupies Bagram. The second, meanwhile, was justified due to the dangers presented by the Taliban selling this equipment to other groups.

Trump also expressed frustration that the US is allegedly spending billions of dollars each year helping to keep Afghanistan afloat. Even if he successfully leverages foreign aid in advance of these interconnected military-strategic goals, which might be counterproductive if China replaces lost American support to entrench its influence in Afghanistan, then he’ll still likely have to cut a deal with Pakistan. That’s because the most viable way for the US to access Afghanistan is from its traditional partner’s airspace and roads.

The problem though is that a growing number of issues have begun to beset their partnership. These include the US’ preference for India as its top regional partner in recent years, criticism of a military court’s conviction of 25 civilians a few months ago in connection with unrest over Imran Khan’s scandalous jailing, and newfound concerns about the true intentions of its long-range missile program. Pakistan is also disappointed that the US hasn’t taken its side over the Taliban amidst their tensions.

While it’s possible that Pakistan’s de facto military regime might literally sell out their nation’s abovementioned interests to let the US transit across its territory en route to Afghanistan if Trump reaches a deal with the Taliban, which is itself easier said than done, that can’t be taken for granted. They might very well bargain hard on some issues in order to receive more than just pecuniary benefits. This could take the form of demanding more military equipment and an end to alleged US meddling.

The first could be manipulated to create the optics of the US rebalancing its relations with India for the purpose of provoking an overreaction from the latter’s decisionmakers or media, while the second could silence criticism of Imran Khan’s scandalous jailing and relieve pressure on its missile program. Of course, another possibility exists, and it’s that Trump doesn’t negotiate fairly with Pakistan but instead ramps up pressure upon it and then promises to reverse what was just added in exchange for what he wants.

That could be accomplished via more official attention being paid to Imran Khan’s case in parallel with threatening the curtailment of existing military aid and sanctions over its missile program. All that would change if Pakistan capitulated to this newfound comprehensive pressure campaign is that the intensity would simply revert back to what it once was instead of remaining high. Instead of giving him what he wants, however, Pakistan might abandon its Sino-US balancing act to defiantly pivot towards China.

That might not be the best course of action from the perspective of Pakistan’s objective national interests since the US could deal a lot of strategic damage to its renegade partner in that scenario. Its military and political leadership could be personally sanctioned, all aid might be immediately withheld, and Trump could double down on the sale of the latest military-technical equipment to India. All of this could also be paired with sectoral sanctions, including secondary ones, for generating more unrest.

Nevertheless, none of this might come to pass since it’s ultimately dependent on Trump reaching a deal with the Taliban for returning to Bagram Airbase and/or returning some of its military equipment that Biden left in Afghanistan, neither of which should be taken for granted. It also remains unclear how serious Trump is about this since he might have just been spitballing like he’s known to sometimes do. Although unlikely, there’s also an out-of-the-box solution, which will now be touched upon.

In the event that a deal is reached with the Taliban but Pakistan remains obstinate in cutting its own with the US, then the US might reach a deal with the Central Asian Republics to facilitate the exit of US military equipment and/or allow the US military transit rights to return to Bagram. This corridor, which relies on the South Caucasus for access to the Eurasian Heartland, was in effect during most of the American occupation of Afghanistan and was referred to as the “Northern Distribution Network”.

In the contemporary geopolitical conditions, this could be achieved in coordination with Russia as a manifestation of the nascent RussianUS “New Détente”, the details of which are beyond the scope of this analysis but can be learned more about from the preceding four hyperlinked analyses. This wouldn’t be anywhere near as economical as securing transit through Pakistan, but it could suffice if that country refuses to cut a deal, and even the possibility might be enough to get its policymakers to reconsider.

Altogether, everything depends on how serious Trump is on reaching a deal with the Taliban; him successfully clinching such; and then the success of his efforts to reach a related one with Pakistan. It’s too early to tell either way in any of these three cases, but any progress on the first part would then put Pakistan in the spotlight, thus making this analysis very relevant. Until then, observers should casually monitor this issue, but they should also temper expectations about anything significant happening.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #ImranKhan #Pakistan #PakistanArmy #Taliban #USA

2025-02-12

Russia Has A Better Chance Of Mediating Afghan-Pakistani Tensions Than China Does

Russia Has A Better Chance Of Mediating Afghan-Pakistani Tensions Than China Does

By Andrew Korybko

Russia’s grand geo-economic plans in this part of Eurasia are dependent on the resolution of these tensions, while China’s will continue being advanced regardless of whatever happens with them.

Russian Ambassador to Pakistan Albert Khorev told TASS over the weekend that his country supports Pakistan and Afghanistan’s respective counter-terrorism efforts. He then added that it encourages both of them to resolve their border tensions through bilateral or multilateral means. This suggests a desire to mediate between them. China has already tried to do so but has struggled to achieve anything, yet Russia has a better chance of success for the reasons that’ll now be explained.

Russia’s grand geo-economic plan in this part of Eurasia is to pioneer parallel connectivity and energy corridors to India via Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. To that end, Russia must cultivate equally excellent relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, help resolve their border tensions, and then do the same with Pakistan and India’s. The first step has already been achieved upon strategically partnering with the Taliban last summer and then clinching a strategic resource pact with Pakistan in December.

The second step will be much more difficult to fulfil but therein lies the purpose behind Ambassador Khorev’s latest remarks regarding Russia’s support for Pakistan and Afghanistan’s respective counter-terrorism efforts. On the one hand, he acknowledged his host country’s problems with Afghan-emanating terrorist threats, but on the other, he shied away from blaming the Taliban for them like Islamabad does and instead offered to provide them with vague “necessary assistance”.

The goal appears to be to empower each in their own way, the first through political support for stopping all terrorist infiltration from Afghanistan, and the second by possibly equipping them with small arms and potentially training their special forces to fight ISIS-K. Left unsaid is any reference to Pakistan’s claims that the Taliban backs the TTP (“Pakistani Taliban”) and other terrorist groups, however, though commenting on this either way would ruin Russia’s careful balancing act.

To be sure, China has already applied the same approach towards this issue, but it lacks the geo-economic vision that Russia does wherein the improvement of Afghan-Pakistani ties is integral to the success of its broader regional policy. Pakistan and Afghanistan don’t need to trade across one another’s territory in order to do business with China since the first employs the Belt & Road Initiative’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor flagship to that end while the second has rail access to it via Central Asia.

Therefore, although China does indeed want its neighbouring partners to work more closely together, this isn’t required to advance its geo-economic interests. The situation is altogether different with Russia, whose grand geo-economic plan necessitates Afghanistan and Pakistan patching up their problems in order to pioneer parallel connectivity and energy corridors that could one day ideally reach India. Those two therefore naturally understand that Russia has much greater stakes in mediation than China does.

Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan would receive additional economic benefits from China upon resolving their tensions, but Pakistan could finally receive more direct overland connectivity with Russia and perhaps even energy from it with time too if that happens, both via Afghanistan. Likewise, Afghanistan could profit from its middleman role in these corridors, especially if they ever extend to India. No such benefits stand to be reaped from China if Beijing were to successfully mediate between them.

Accordingly, it’s incumbent on Russia to utilize creative means for moving this diplomatic process along to the best of its ability, which could include sharing detailed plans of its proposed connectivity and energy investments in both in Afghanistan and Pakistan should they agree to resolve their disputes. These could include specific projects, the estimated amount that’ll be invested, lending terms if required, the possibility for joint ownership of some sort, and the local labour that might be employed.

It might still not be enough for a breakthrough, but it would still be more than what China has offered to do if they make peace, which is nothing. Moreover, such a detailed proposal could later be returned to if the political and/or military situation changes and they decide to patch up their problems, in which case they’d have a mutual interest in reviving Russia’s plans. It’s too early to predict what’ll happen either way, just that Russia is expected to push for peace, and its efforts will be more meaningful than China’s.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #China #Geopolitics #Pakistan #Russia #Taliban #TehrikITalibanPakistan #TTP

2025-01-26

2025 Might Be A Difficult Year For Sino-Pak Ties

2025 Might Be A Difficult Year For Sino-Pak Ties

By Andrew Korybko

Here’s the full interview that I gave to VOA China’s FM Shakil on this subject, excerpts of which were published in their report on 20 January titled “安全和阿富汗问题将考验2025年中国与巴基斯坦的关系”

Sino-Pak ties officially remain excellent, but they appear to have been placed under a lot of strain over the past year. Pakistan’s inability to protect Chinese workers reflects poorly on its role in hosting the Belt & Road Initiative’s (BRI) flagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Where CPEC goes, so goes BRI, or so the perception is among some who consider this megaproject to be a bellwether of this global infrastructure network’s success. It’s little wonder then that China is concerned about its long-term viability.

The latest terrorist attacks in Pakistan are thought to be connected to Afghanistan due to reports that the “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP) and “Balochistan Liberation Army” (BLA) are operating out of that country with the tacit approval of the Afghan Taliban (simply the “Taliban”).

Some believe that the Taliban is using terrorist-designated groups as a means of asymmetrically compensating for their conventional military weakness vis-a-vis their former Pakistani patron with whom they’re feuding over the Durand Line, the British-imposed border between Afghanistan and what later became Pakistan, which the Taliban doesn’t recognize.

Regardless of their possible motivation in speculatively resorting to such means to balance Pakistan’s power, the fact of the matter is that these groups are creating a dangerous environment for CPEC, especially the BLA, which sometimes directly targets associated projects and Chinese workers.

The problem from China’s perspective is therefore two-fold: the Taliban is allegedly employing terrorist proxies against Pakistan, which is already troubling enough, but Pakistan is unable to adequately protect CPEC projects and Chinese workers, which is arguably due to its misplaced priority of cracking down on former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s PTI opposition party.

Both of these are outside of China’s direct ability to influence as has been seen. Its prior diplomacy in these regards hasn’t succeeded in getting Afghanistan to eschew such scandalous means for balancing Pakistan’s power, Pakistan continues prioritizing its crackdown on the opposition over its anti-terrorist interests, and ties between these neighbouring Chinese-friendly countries continue to deteriorate as proven by the latest tit-for-tat border violence.

If Afghan-Pak relations keep worsening, then China might consider informally curtailing investment into CPEC and possibly even freezing existing projects, including on unrelated pretexts if that happens and its representatives are pressed to publicly account for this in order to avoid the perception that it’s pulling back from BRI’s flagship project.

To add a twist to everything, Donald Trump’s return to the American Presidency might see him possibly provide some form of assistance to Pakistan’s latest anti-terrorist campaign, but on the condition that it pulls back from CPEC (also even if only informally) and provides the US with privileged investment and other opportunities to balance Chinese influence in the country.

His first term was characterized by his economic-driven transactional style so the precedent exists, though he might not ultimately propose such a deal, or it could also include the unacceptable condition of Pakistan curtailing its long-range ballistic missile program against which the former Biden Administration just imposed sanctions, including unprecedented ones against a state agency.

In any case, 2025 might be a difficult year for Sino-Pak relations due to Pakistan’s worsening domestic security situation caused by Afghan-based terrorists (especially the BLA) and Trump’s plans to more muscularly contain China, the latter of which could see him trying to apply more pressure on CPEC in order to discredit BRI as a whole (if the aforesaid upsurge in terrorism doesn’t do so first).

Excerpts from this interview were published in VOA China’s report on 20 January titled 安全和阿富汗问题将考验2025年中国与巴基斯坦的关系

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRI #China #CPEC #Geopolitics #Pakistan #PakistanArmy #Taliban #TehrikITalibanPakistan #TTP

2025-01-11

Why’s The Russian-Taliban Bounty Scandal From Summer 2020 Suddenly Back In The News?

Why’s The Russian-Taliban Bounty Scandal From Summer 2020 Suddenly Back In The News?

By Andrew Korybko

The Insider, which is designated as a foreign agent in Russia, wants to complicate Trump’s peace talks with Russia, improve US ties with Pakistan at the expense of ties with India, and pry Tajikistan away from the CSTO.

The Insider brought summer 2020’s Russian-Taliban bounty scandal back to the news after publishing their latest report on this subject last week. They’re designated as a foreign agent by Russia, and two of their article’s three co-authors – Christo Grozev and Roman Dobrokhotov – are wanted by the Interior Ministry. Grozev also used to lead Bellingcat’s Russia investigations, who are also designated as foreign agents and which Russia’s foreign spy chief accused of being in cahoots with Western intelligence.

The aforesaid details are being shared so that readers know better than to take their words at face value. The Insider’s report is full of bombshells about the Russian-Taliban bounty scandal, and regardless of whether or not one believes what they wrote, they’re bound to have a narrative impact. That’s because they claim that Russia did indeed pay the Taliban for each American that they killed, there’s allegedly a connection to regional actors too, and all of this is coming out right before Trump’s reinauguration.

In the order that they were mentioned, The Insider purports to have mapped GRU’s Afghan assassination network, which they present as lending credence to these accusations. Readers can review their report to learn more about what they supposedly discovered, but it boils down to spies using diplomatic and business cover to pass along orders and payments to the Taliban. The impression is that Russia is guilty as charged, which could justify the Biden Administration designating it as a state sponsor of terrorism.

As for the regional actors that are allegedly involved, the primary one is Iran, which The Insider claims arranged the first Russian-Taliban contacts. They also reported that Russia funnelled arms to the Taliban from its base in Tajikistan and is plotting to help them against Dushanbe. There’s also a vague connection between GRU’s assassins and India. The first claim could lead to more US pressure on Iran, the second could sow discord between these allies, while the third could derail the likely Indo-US rapprochement.

And finally, the timing of all this is clearly meant to complicate Trump’s efforts to negotiate an end to the Ukrainian Conflict with Russia. Even if the Biden Administration doesn’t designate it as a state sponsor of terrorism in order to maximally impede his diplomacy, the media attention that might be given to The Insider’s report could lead to more manufactured pressure on him to reconsider his plans to meet with Putin. There could also be important implications for Trump’s foreign policy towards the broader region.

Prior to this development, Trump was largely indifferent towards the Taliban, his envoy for special missions Richard Grenell seemed ready to leverage newly worsening US ties with Pakistan to secure Imran Khan’s release as part of a grand deal, while a US-Indo rapprochement seemed inevitable. All of that might change if his administration believes the previously mentioned allegations and thus decides to improve US-Pakistani ties at the Taliban’s and India’s expense in the ways that’ll now be described.

Pakistan and the Taliban are once again on the brink of war after their tit-for-tat cross-border attacks stemming from Islamabad’s accusations that the group hosts terrorist-designated TTP militants and Kabul’s refusal to recognize the Durand Line between their nations. If Trump is manipulated into wanting revenge for the alleged bounty plot, then he might drop Khan’s cause and ignore Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile program in order to use that country as a proxy against the Taliban.

Nearby Tajikistan despises the neighbouring Taliban for ideological reasons (it’s strictly secular while they’re Islamic fundamentalists) and due to its persecution of ethnic Tajiks in the north, whose numbers are larger than those in Tajikistan proper, which places them on the same side as Pakistan in Afghanistan. Tajik-Pakistani ties have also strengthened in recent years, especially the past one after Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Dushanbe in July and then sent his spy chief there right before the New Year.

Tajikistan might more therefore actively diversify from its military-strategic dependence on Russia in light of the latest reports that GRU armed their Taliban enemies from Russia’s base in the country and is now plotting to help the group against Dushanbe, to which end it could redouble such ties with Pakistan. This could serve to create a rift between these allies that the US could then exploit for divide-and-rule purposes for prying Tajikistan away from the CSTO just like it practically already pried away Armenia.

That Russian-led bloc prohibits foreign military bases on members’ soil without prior consensus, yet the workaround as pioneered by the Armenian precedent is to host foreign troops disguised as “observers” or indefinitely suspend membership in the CSTO. This could unfold in the Tajik context if Trump patches up the US’ problems with Pakistan in pursuit of shared anti-Taliban interests, works with it and Dushanbe to arm that group’s foes, and then requests an in-country military presence to facilitate this.

Already troubled Indo-US relations would further worsen in parallel with improved Pakistani-US ones, but this would have the consequence of precluding India’s informal role in any forthcoming US-led regional pressure campaign against China as part of Trump’s expected “Pivot (back) to Asia”. He might therefore be reminded by the Indophilic members of his administration of that country’s importance to the US’ grand strategic, which could get him to reconsider the abovementioned anti-Taliban scenario.

Regardless of whatever happens, there shouldn’t be any doubt that the timing of The Insider’s latest report about the Russian-Taliban bounty scandal and the details thereof are meant to influence Trump’s foreign policy, though it can only be speculated whether they’ll succeed in whole or in part. Upon analysing their intentions, it appears that they want to complicate Trump’s peace talks with Russia, improve US ties with Pakistan at the expense of ties with India, and pry Tajikistan away from the CSTO.

The most effective way to counter this is for Trump to stay the course with his noble peace efforts; for India to remind the US that documented Pakistani support for the Taliban was much more meaningful in all respects by far than whatever Russia allegedly gave the group in terms of arms and finances; and for Russia to proactively reassure Tajikistan that it’ll never sacrifice its interests to the Taliban and offering more aid to it too in order to preemptively avert the possibility of the US “outbidding” it in the future.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #CSTO #DonaldTrump #Pakistan #Russia #Tajikistan #Taliban #USA

Bernardo Dainesedainesebernardo
2021-09-15
2021-08-30

ஆப்கானிஸ்தானை முழுமையாக கண்காணிக்கிறது இந்தியா! பாதுகாப்புத் துறை அமைச்சர் ராஜ்நாத் சிங். patrikai.com/were-constantly-m via @patrikaidotcom@twitter.com

#AfghanistanCrisis #Afghanistan #AfghanTaliban #Afghan #Taliban #Talibans @rajnathsingh@twitter.com @MEAIndia@twitter.com @DrSJaishankar@twitter.com @PMOIndia@twitter.com

The Pigeon Expressthepigeonexpress
2021-08-24
CPIM Tamilnadutncpim
2021-08-23

சோவியத் ஒன்றியத்தை வீழ்த்துவதற்கு பல்வேறு சக்திகளுக்கு ஆயுதங்களையும் பயிற்சிகளையும் அமெரிக்கா உதவியுள்ளது என்பதை ஹிலாரி கிளின்டன் வெளிப்படையாக ஒத்துக் கொண்டுள்ளார். More: youtu.be/lqhOB3ArJlo

The Pigeon Expressthepigeonexpress
2021-08-20
CPIM Tamilnadutncpim
2021-08-20

சோவியத் ஒன்றியத்தை வீழ்த்துவதற்கு பல்வேறு சக்திகளுக்கு ஆயுதங்களையும் பயிற்சிகளையும் அமெரிக்கா உதவியுள்ளது என்பதை ஹிலாரி கிளின்டன் வெளிப்படையாக ஒத்துக் கொண்டுள்ளார். More: youtu.be/mbedcddmI7U

2021-08-14

அமெரிக்கா வெளியேறியதும் ஆப்கனை முற்றிலுமாக கைப்பற்றுகிறது தாலிபான்… நிலைமை மோசமாக உள்ளதாக ஐ.நா. கவலை patrikai.com/taliban-seize-con via @patrikaidotcom@twitter.com

#Afghanishtan #AfghanTaliban #Taliban #USA

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