This has already led to the rekindling of the #SSCKhatumo conflict and the birth of an #Awdal insurgency in #Somaliland, a proxy war between Somaliland and #Djibouti, and the looming threat of an Ethiopian-Egyptian proxy war in #Somalia. Al #Shabaab (AS) has already largely benefitted from the spat and seems to have formed close ties with the #Houthis.
#Shabaab
Ethiopian client regions #Jubaland and Southwest are highly dependent on Ethiopian continued military involvement to fight Al #Shabaab (AS) and have previously expressed their opposition to any escalatory move on the part of #Somalia. This new show of force however, after several thousand Ehtiopian troops crossed the border in June, can be expected to trigger Somali resistance and further strengthen AS propaganda.
#China has signalled for a few years her interests in turning the region into a “hub of peace, development and prosperity”, but her efforts have come short. Although her mediation between #Iran and #SaudiArabia had welcome effects in the region, her sympathy for Iran should have given her the tools to mitigate the impact of the Iran-#Israel proxy war on the Horn. Instead, reports of ever tighter cooperation between #Houthis and Al #Shabaab worsen conflicts in #Kenya and #Somalia.
#Somalia is caught between a rock and a hard place. Her vital interests include collaborating with neighbouring #Ethiopia to quench Al #Shabaab (AS), with a rekindled bilateral hostility causing further tensions between regional states and Mogadiscio. She meanwhile has to undertake a propaganda war with AS over inflamed national and religious feelings. Taking a firm stance is a matter of political survival for her leadership.
Other fronts concern #Somalia’s sovereignty over its airspace and the Abudwak incident, reframed by Somalia as Ethiopian support to Al #Shabaab.
https://medium.com/@mathieu.gotteland/ethiopia-somalia-the-war-for-the-air-8b4759531c02
https://medium.com/@mathieu.gotteland/the-abudwak-incident-463459cfc45f
Calls for the resignation of president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud are not new. The blame has usually been directed at the realization of the programme on which he has been elected. Difficulties on the front against Al #Shabaab, a looming threat of war with #Ethiopia and #Somaliland and a constitutional crisis of Hassan Sheikh’s own making, alienating #Puntland, mean the Abudwak incident might prove a turning point in his tenure however.
Some reports point to the responsibility of arms dealers close to the Somali and Djiboutian power circles, with the arms originating in #Djibouti and transiting through #Ethiopia. Others believe the arms have been purchased in Ethiopia to equip regional forces in #Galmudug. Opposition MPs have worried the weapons were intended for Al #Shabaab and praised the militia for taking control of the cargo.
New publication: #Somalia's Foreign Relations in the Context of the Latest Offensive against Al #Shabaab
in the Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies
https://jceeas.bdi.uni-obuda.hu/index.php/jceeas/article/view/269
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is firstly a diplomat. Neither the all-out war against Al #Shabaab nor the spat with #Ethiopia were his first choice, although he holds neither very dear.
On Al Shabaab, the situation is contrasted to say the least, and the government has sent contradictory signals on its willingness to negotiate.
The only upside of this looming conflict is the reinforcement of Djiboutian-Somali solidarity in the face of #Ethiopia, #Somaliland and Al #Shabaab. #Djibouti will be a key player of #Somalia’s post-#ATMIS future, despite its limited size. Elders of the #Gadabuursi clan had first seeked support in Mogadiscio before turning to their immediate neighbour.
It has, however, had several unintended but perfectly foreseeable consequences, including putting an end to the Ethiopian-Somali alliance, threatening #war between #Ethiopia and #Somalia, dooming Somalia-Somaliland talks, strengthening Al #Shabaab, isolating Ethiopia on the global stage and further weakening #Somaliland.
#terrorism #Somalia #Djibouti
The alternative, namely Gara’ad, does not present the same advantages as either Djibouti or Berbera. The port remains to be “developed” and a road constructed to the Ethiopian border, while #IslamicState and a new Al #Shabaab-#Houthi axis are assessed as growing threats.
Until 1 January and the #Ethiopia-#Somaliland MoU, that country was considered the main ally in the fight against Al #Shabaab (AS). An Ethiopian pledge to contribute more troops was pivotal to #Somalia’s security after #ATMIS was to end in December 2024.
In the current circumstances however, this is merely a show of force.
Again, it triggered natural reactions from #Southwest and #Jubaland states, which have not only been described as #Ethiopia’s “client states” but are also heavily dependent on Ethiopia’s continued involvement to keep Al #Shabaab (AS) at bay.
Despite President Mohamud recently stating that #Ethiopia "will never be our ally", the fact is Ethiopian-Somali cooperation is vital to both countries, especially when AS is showing its potency within Ethiopia herself.
Before the #Ethiopia-#Somaliland MoU, Mohamud's "zero enemy outside" policy, the only 2 exceptions were #Israel and #Iran. While some hope had been harboured to normalize relations with Israel before the #Gaza war, this is not feasible anymore. A speech by Somali PM Barre in support of #Hamas and with antisemitic overtones has been trying to overdo Al #Shabaab and #IslamicState - and backfired.
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