#atop

2025-09-28

В новый #htop добавили вкладку с i/o, теперь #iotop стал ненужен. Осталось добавить функции #atop, #atopsar, мониторинг сети и будет универсальный комбайн для мониторинга системы.

Juan "manieflo" Flores🇦🇷✅manielfo
2025-07-11

Nuevo contenido... hoy estuve viendo y probé algunos que no conocía como : -tui elprofejuan.duckdns.org/autosa

ricardo :mastodon:governa@fosstodon.org
2025-07-01

#Atop - The Advanced System and Process Monitor for #Linux

tecmint.com/atop-linux-perform

2025-04-05

Oh, #atop fixed their security issue atoptool.nl/downloadatop.php

2025-03-30

So, there's a lot of news about #atop right now, and people are recommending switching to #btop, and I wonder if this trend continues will we ever run out of letters and have to resort to "aatop"?

Which means, inevitably, someone will write a "#zztop"

2025-03-29

@ska @tony @losttourist

The updated news is that atopgpud's TCP service, that I mentioned, is indeed one problem.

github.com/Atoptool/atop/issue

It does beg the question of why it uses TCP at all, when an AF_LOCAL socket in /run/atop/ or something is more in line with its other data-collection service.

#atop

2025-03-29

@jschauma

Far from the only problem with atopgpud.

tty0.social/@JdeBP/11422997604

#atop

2025-03-28

@losttourist @b3lt3r

However, note that someone else has run xyr own code checker on atop in the meantime and claims to have found a problem nonetheless.

#atop

2025-03-28

@losttourist @b3lt3r

I saw it, and I agree with people's response to "This is not the way to do this.", which was: "Then why did you do it that way, then?"

#atop

2025-03-27

I've just installed #atop on #sydbox #ctf server in case people want to explore exploiting the recent heap corruption. I don't trust jia tan enough to leave atop.service running as root though so the attack vector is limited. Sail with #ssh to syd.chesswob.org (user/pass: syd) or go to syd.chesswob.org although the #nodejs client is a bit more limited. See here for the #security issue, openwall.com/lists/oss-securit (tl;dr uninstall #atop asap!) and here for #sydbox #ctf ctftime.org/event/2178

2025-03-27

@lattera

There's a whole bunch of dodgy stuff, from atopgpud to code that assumes that it can blat a NUL and then call strcpy().

See thread at
social.chatty.monster/@losttou

#atop

2025-03-27

@tony @losttourist

People who wrote their system tools with safe string libraries such as DJB's, skalibs, or even just C++'s std::string automatically suspect such tries-to-be-clever-with-NULs code.

At the bare minimum, tag the SPC onto the destination buffer & don't touch the (possibly only 1) NUL-terminated source buffer. But better yet, don't do it that way at all.

But there are so many other poor practices in that software, including the aforementioned atopgpud TCP server.

@ska

#atop

2025-03-27

@tony @losttourist

These things when undisclosed are usually almost never reflected in GitHub.

I looked at the code yesterday, and, from inspection only, my suspicion immediately landed on photoproc.c .

There's some dodgy C trickery going on there that I wouldn't put past having some edge cases.

Assuming (wrongly) that a string is doubly-NUL terminated (not guaranteed by getdelim()), blatting the first NUL with a SPC and then calling strcpy() is just one such suspect case.

#atop

2025-03-27

Glanced at a little #atop code. Found two vulns. The NULL PTR deref likely can only be triggered by exploiting the TOCTOU race condition.

#infosec

Screenshot of atop source code, annotated with two vulnerabilities:

1. A TOCTOU by using `access` before calling `fopen` rather than simply accessing the file.
2. A NULL pointer dereference when `fopen` fails.

The NULL pointer deref will likely only crash the application. Not much to see here.
Emily Gladstone ColeEmily@infosec.exchange
2025-03-26

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