#tlsa

2025-02-09

🚨 Fixing the PKI Mess: CAA + Your Own CA via DNS 🚨

Right now, any CA can issue a certificate for your domain. Even if you set a CAA record (`issue "letsencrypt.org"`), it only controls *who* can issue, not what cert is valid. This is broken.

🔐 What if we could fix this using DNS?

#Introducing CAA+CA Fingerprint: Self-Sovereign Certificate Authority
Instead of just saying *which CA can issue*, you publish your own CA's fingerprint in DNS. If your CA issues a cert for `awesomecars.com`, browsers should validate it against the DNS-published CA key.

🔥 How It Works
You run your own CA (because why trust the cartel?). You then publish:
1️⃣ A CAA record specifying your own CA (with a fingerprint! 🔥)
2️⃣ A DNS record with your CA’s public key (like DKIM but for TLS!)

🔹 Example DNS Setup for `awesomecars.com`:
```
awesomecars.com. IN CAA 0 issue "pki.awesomecars.com; sha256=abcd1234..."
pki.awesomecars.com. IN CERT 6 0 0 (--BEGIN CERTIFICATE-- ....)
```
Now, only certs signed by your CA are valid for `awesomecars.com`, even if another CA is tricked into issuing a rogue cert. No more CA hijacking!

🚀 Why Is This Better Than the Current CA Model?
✅ Self-Sovereign Identity: If you own the domain, you should own its PKI.
✅ Prevents Rogue Certs: No government or rogue CA can fake a cert for your domain.
✅ Works Like DKIM for Email: Your CA’s public key is stored in DNSSEC-protected records, just like DKIM keys for email signing.
✅ No More External Trust Issues: You control your CA entirely, instead of relying on Google’s CA store.
✅ Perfect for Self-Hosting & Internal Networks: No need for external CA trust—your DNS is your trust model.

🔥 Why Isn’t This a Thing Already?
Big Tech hates this idea because it removes their control:
❌ Google wants Certificate Transparency (CT), where they control which certs are logged.
❌ Commercial CAs make $$$ selling certs. This kills their business.
❌ DNSSEC adoption is intentionally kept low by the same companies who don’t want this to succeed.

Browsers refuse to support TLSA for the same reason—they want centralized CA trust, not self-hosted PKI.

🔗 Who Needs to Implement This?
🚀 Self-hosters & Homelabs: Use this for your own infrastructure.
🚀 Email providers: Stop relying on public CAs!
🚀 Privacy-focused projects (Tor, Matrix, XMPP, Fediverse, etc.): A true decentralized PKI alternative.
🚀 Fediverse devs: Let’s push for DNS-based CA validation!

What do you think? Would you trust your own CA in DNS over some random commercial CA?

🔁 Boost this if you want a decentralized PKI revolution!

🔥 This keeps the focus on self-hosting your own CA, highlights the security flaws of current PKI, and calls out Big Tech’s resistance to decentralized trust.

#PKI #Security #DNSSEC #DANE #TLSA #CAA #SelfHosting #Fediverse #Privacy #Decentralization #dns #linux

Matthias Schmidt Gollum DN9MSm@ms.vg
2025-02-02

#googlemail #gmail hat #DNSSEC #DMARC und #DANE #TLSA kapott.

Nur, falls ihr euch wundert, dass heute wenig E-Mails ankommen.

Aber wenn eure Mail Provider gerne unsicher ist, merkt ihr davon nichts.

2025-01-15

@bagder @jelu @icing I think there is a case for #DNSSEC in curl because of #SMTP and the slowly increasing support for #DANE #TLSA. In my book that’s the premiere method of TLS downgrade protection in the email world.

But that has time. I’m already glad if #HTTPS #ECH is supported in (my) curl sometime soon 😀

Gea-Suan Lingslin@abpe.org
2024-10-31

DNS 的 TLSA record

發現沒寫過 TLSA record,這是屬於 DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities),比較好理解就是透過 DNS 提供簽名認證資訊。

是因為看到 AWS 的 Amazon Route 53 這篇公告想到去查 TLSA record 的:「Amazon Route 53 announces HTTPS, SSHFP, SVCB, and TLSA DNS resource record support」。

目前 TLS certificate 認證的方式主要是

blog.gslin.org/archives/2024/1

#AWS #Cloud #Computer #DNS #Murmuring #Network #Security #Service #amazon #aws #cloud #dns #record #route53 #service #tlsa

2024-10-30

Claudia Plattner, President of German BSI, has just been featured in an article on email security in eco's dotmagazine. It's a wake up call and invitation to enhance email security in a joined effort :blobs:

I like it :ablobsmile:

dotmagazine.online/issues/digi

#SPF #DKIM #DMARC #DANE #TLSA #MTASTS #TLSRPT #Mailsecurity #TeamBSI @bsi

2024-10-30

Good things are coming to Exchange users it seems :think_starry_eyes: Took a bit longer than expected though 😉

techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5

#DANE #TLSA #Mailsecurity

2024-10-01

So, inbound DANE for SMTP is set up as well. I just circumvented the rollover 'problem' on key changes by reusing the key for now:

senvang.org/posts/2024/10/dane

#dane #smtp #mailserver #dns #letsencrypt #certbot #tlsa

2024-09-25

The Internet Security Days 2024 marked the starting point for a new effort by eco and @bsi to raise adoption of modern email security standards across Germany and worldwide. I'm honored that I was allowed to shape some of the contents of this great event and mailsecurity is finally getting the attention it deserves 💌 :blobcatthx:

international.eco.de/news/inte

#DMARC #SPF #DKIM #DANE #TLSA #MTASTS #TLSRPT #Mailsecurity #TeamBSI

2024-08-03

Wichtiger Hinweis für alle die #LetsEncrypt Zertifikate mit #TLSA (DANE-TA) Records nutzen: Seit 2024-06-06 haben ausgestellte Zertifikate eine neue Intermediate CA, deswegen müssen neue Einträge erstellt werden, jetzt auch für die Backup-CAs.

dnssec-stats.ant.isi.edu/~vikt

Wer also RSA+ECDSA Zertifikate nutzt muss die DNS-TLSA-Records für R10,R11,R12,R13,R14 und E5,E6,E7,E8,E9 hinzufügen.

#mail #selfhost

2024-07-23

Let's Encrypt has made implementing DANE even more difficult. The root CA is no longer included in the chain, and the intermediates may change without notice. To address these issues, I wrote a script that automates TLSA record creation from the published intermediates.

#letsencrypt #dane #tlsa #certificatepinning

github.com/oh2fih/Misc-Scripts

2024-06-25

I very much recommend this article on #EmailSecurity written by my colleague Kristina for eco's dotmagazine :blobcatreading: It'll give you a brief overview on both of our Technical Guidelines (BSI TR-03108 and BSI TR-03182) and what we released them for 😀👍

dotmagazine.online/issues/buil

#SPF #DKIM #DMARC #DANE #TLSA #MTASTS #TLSRPT #Mailsecurity #TeamBSI

2024-06-11

@vdukhovni I messed #dane up and forgot to update the 2 1 1 #tlsa records. I am subscribed to the mailinglist but somehow forgot to read the mails. Thanks to your dedicated mail to #postmaster you made me aware of the issue. I really appreciate that ❤️

2024-03-26

No more #DANE validation problem on www.ripe.net and potaroo.net : #TLSA record is gone :(

Hope they'll be back 🥺

2024-03-22

Found another website with broken #DANE / #TLSA record (I'm becoming good at this ^^')

You might know this one if you're interested in #BGP or #DNS ;)

$ gnutls-cli --dane www.potaroo.net
...
- Status: The certificate is trusted.
- DANE: Verification failed. The certificate differs.
*** Fatal error: Error in the certificate.

Michal Hrušecký :turris: :geeko:michal@hrusecky.net
2024-02-20

I wrote another #blogpost about managing your #DNS via #KnotDNS and #SaltStack, this time about how to #automate / #orchestrate your #TLSA records. http://michal.hrusecky.net/2024/02/salt-dns-web/

2023-12-12

Cette déconvenue avec afnic.fr/ m'a permis de constater que le plugin #DANE / #TLSA que j'utilise dans Firefox fonctionne :

Page orange qui fait mal aux yeux avec message d'avertissement me demandant si je veux continuer à naviguer sur le site, malgré une erreur de validation

EDIT : module qui n'est plus dispo dans le magasin du Panda Roux :/

debian-fr.org/t/dnssec-dane-va

2023-11-28

#DNS #DANE #TLSA: can somebody confirm debian.org TLSA is broken (www.debian.org seems ok) before I try to report it ? cc @bortzmeyer

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