Something about the way the consequentializing literature (and as a result the normative ethics literature more generally) defines what makes a moral theory consequentialist always bothered me. It always felt like the definition was trying to give precision beyond what makes sense for a family of views. But of course "that's too precise of a definition" is not an objection that gets taken very seriously by analytic philosophers.
I always tried to vaguely gesture at my worry in conversation by saying things like "consequentialism isn't a theory or set of theories, its a tradition."
I don't think that's wrong, but I can understand why is always left my interlocutors unsatisfied.
I think finally reading some Elisabeth Camp has helped it click for me - I think consequentialism is a Campian *perspective* (something like a cluster of dispositions and patterns of salience in deliberation), and the consequentialist tradition is the set of people who have roughly overlapping Campian perspectives about how to approach moral theory.
I think this is also equally true of deontology and virtue theory.
On this proposal, we shouldn't think about dividing moral theories in terms of logical structure or even of how they answer some set of paradigmatic moral dilemmas (though there will be non-coincidental connections), but in terms of which things are taken to be salient and how to approach moral theory. While certain approaches will tend to lead to certain answers to these questions about structure and solutions to moral dilemmas, they don't entail them.
#philosophy #ethics #analyticphilosophy