#SocialHacking

Kevin Karhan :verified:kkarhan@infosec.space
2025-12-17

#YetAnotherReason why noone should ask for a #PhoneNumber, much less to consider it a "#security" feature...

Repeat after me: #PhoneNumbers are insecure and #2FA - #SMS are even less secure!!!

#Callcenter #India #ScamCallcenter #ScamCallcenters #Scam #ConsumerProtection #JimBrowning

Bernd Kilgaconsole
2025-10-01

I've been trying to delete an account for months. The company is completely stubborn and requires me to scan my ID and send it by email (yeah, right) so they can verify my date of birth.

Last night, I had an idea. Social engineering deluxe: I simply replied to the ticket email: ‘Thank you for confirming my date of birth. Do you need anything else? Can you now proceed with deleting the account?’

And the reply: ‘Your account has been marked for deletion.’

WIN!

2025-09-10

Rachel Tobac é especialista em engenharia social. Mantém a empresa Social Proof Security, que ajuda a identificar falhas na segurança de empresas e ensina como melhorar os procedimentos de verificação de identidade.

Be politely paranoid

Rachel Tobac (1h09 no vídeo no final desse post)

O vídeo ao final tem 1h10 e vale a pena porque é bem divertido! Vou destacar os prontos principais, […]

https://www.memedecarbono.com.br/sociedade_cibernetica/privacidade_seguranca/rachel-tobac-e-social-hacking/

Foto de Rachel Tobac
Kevin Karhan :verified:kkarhan@infosec.space
2025-07-15

@stman @Sempf @LaF0rge yes.

Because physical SIMs, like any "cryptographic chipcard" (i.e. @nitrokey ) did all that fancy public/private crypto on silicon and unless that was compromizeable (which AFAICT always necessistated physical access to the #SIM, espechally in pre-#OMAPI devices) the SIM wasn't 'cloneable' and the weakest link always had been the #MNO /.#MVNO issueing (may it be through #SocialHacking employees into #SimSwapping or LEAs showng up with a warrant and demanding "#LawfulInterception"):

Add to that the regression in flexibility:

Unlike a #SimCard which was designed as a vendor-independent, #MultiVendor, #MultiProvider, device agnostic unit to facilitate the the #authentification and #encryption in #GSM (and successor standards), #eSIMs act to restrict #DeviceFreedom and #ConsumerChoice, which with shit like #KYC per #IMEI (i.e. #Turkey demands it after 90 days of roaming per year) und #lMEI-based #Allowlisting (see #Australia's shitty #VoLTE + #2G & #3G shutdown!) are just acts to clamp down on #privacy and #security.

  • And with #EID being unique per #eSIM (like the #IMEI on top!) there's nothing stopping #cyberfacist regimes like "P.R." #China, #Russia, #Iran, ... from banning "#eSIMcards" (#eSIM in SIM card form factor) or entire device prefixes (i.e. all phones that are supported by @GrapheneOS ), as M(V)NOs see the EID used to deploy/activate a profile (obviously they don't want people to activate eSIMs more than once, unless explicitly allowed otherwise.

"[…] [Technologies] must always be evaluated for their ability to oppress. […]

  • Dan Olson

And now you know why I consider a #smartphone with eSIM instead of two SIM slots not as a real #DualSIM device because it restricts my ability to freely move devices.

  • And whilst German Courts reaffirmed §77 TKG (Telco Law)'s mandate to letting people choose their devices freely, (by declarong #fees for reissue of eSIMs illegal) that is only enforceable towards M(V)NOs who are in #Germany, so 'good luck' trying to enforce that against some overseas roaming provider.

Thus #Impersonation attacks in GSM-based networks are easier than ever before which in the age of more skilled than ever #Cybercriminals and #Cyberterrorists (i.e. #NSA & #Roskomnadnozr) puts espechally the average #TechIlliterate User at risk.

  • I mean, anyone else remember the #Kiddies that fucked around with #CIA director #Brennan? Those were just using their "weapons-grade #boredom", not being effective, for-profit cyber criminals!

And then think about those who don't have privilegued access to protection by their government, but rather "privilegued access" to prosecution by the state because their very existance is criminalized...

The only advantage eSIMs broight in contrast is 'logistical' convenience because it's mostly a #QRcode and that's just a way to avoid typos on a cryptic #LocalProfileAgent link.

Kevin Karhan :verified:kkarhan@infosec.space
2025-03-21

@hoernchen72 @fasnix @expertenkommision_cyberunfall EXAKT DAS!

Oft sind das #Betrüber die Menschen dazu überreden (#SocialEngineering / #SocialHacking) und/oder entsprechend #FUD machen.

Ist nix anderes als die #Schockanruf-Taktik, nur halt 'irgendwas mit #Cyber' und sei's nen Fake-#Popup.

Kevin Karhan :verified:kkarhan@infosec.space
2025-03-04

@GossiTheDog the sheer fact that #MSPs & #CSPs can access clients' setups without proper #authorization [including #KYC / #KYB, #AuthCode|s and proper authorization via contract] is already sickening.

Such fundamental #ITsec fuckups are reasons alone not to use #Azure or any #Microsoft products & services at all...

  • I mean, it doesn't require #Mitnick-level skills to pull this off, since it doesn't necessitate #Lapsus-Style #SIMswap or other means to gain access...
5021tips5021tips
2024-08-21

si ya kwenye tu ...BUT pamoja na kuchezea akili ya mtu ifanye jinsi unataka kuliko jinsi mwenye hiyo akili anataka afanye. AU?

@Saupreiss Aber meist hören sie ja eh nicht. Nicht nur auf mich nicht. Die Info: „Es werden vor allem eher Menschen als Geräte gehackt“ wird nicht verstanden. Dass ER das Passwort des Routers nie geändert hat, dass ER auf den vermeintlichen OneDrive-Ordner-Link seines Kollegen geklickt und seine MS-Daten eingegeben hat, dass ER 2FA zu umständlich findet will niemand verstehen… (ER=Der Mensch, nicht der Nachbar konkret) #SocialHacking #Scam

Kevin Karhan :verified:kkarhan@mstdn.social
2023-06-09

@q Which reminds me how fucked up and fundamentally broken #SSL is and that the entire #RentSeeking businesses of #CA's must be abolished.

Instead of @letsencrypt, we should've pushed for #CAcert since the latter one actually does #DueDiligence and is harder to penetrate or even abuse than getting an EV-SSL - cert fraudulently via #SocialHacking...

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