IMO, #NZPol Deputy PM and #AtlasNetwork Act Party leader David Seymour needs to be investigated and prosecuted for treason against the sovereignty of #Aotearoa #NewZealand. #GCSB #SIS
#gcsb
Will be interesting to see if this goes anywhere. .
One of the three lawyers who made the call, University of Auckland associate professor Treasa Dunworth, said the inspector-general of intelligence and security was thorough and she thought he would appreciate their argument that Government Communications Security Bureau and Security Intelligence Service intelligence might be making its way to Israel via the US.
'Improper': NZ spy agency slammed for secretly hosting foreign spying
New Zealand’s international spy agency has been rebuked for hosting a foreign agency’s spy operation for several years without telling its minister, and without knowing whether doing so was contributing to military strikes overseas.... #newzealand #gcsb #5eyes #spying #surveillance #surveillancecapitalism #asiapacific #cia #worldnews
“The Inspector-General has found significant failings in the GCSB’s hosting of a foreign partner’s system”
There’s a PDF linked in this tweet from the NZ Inspector-General of Intelligence Services, vaguely detailing how (presumably: US, UK, AU or CDN) foreign spooks parked a spooky surveillance “capability” on NZ soil and ran it without telling anyone, nor (worse) keeping proper records. Both are typical* but the latter deserves calling out as it’s yet more evidence that private industry can’t trust Governments to hold back-doors or “golden keys” to encrypted messaging. Quotes:
5.3. The record-keeping of the decision process was poor and there are significant gaps, which have made it difficult to identify reasons for certain decisions, particularly whether concerns about the capability were mitigated by redrafts to the MOU. There appears to be no substantive written legal advice, despite the GCSB’s General Counsel being involved throughout the process.
5.4. Despite the then acting Director-General anticipating that the Minister responsible for the GCSB would be informed about the capability and possibly asked to approve GCSB hosting the system, this inquiry found no evidence of the Minister being told about the capability […]
7. I found that the capability operated at GCSB:
7.1. without adequate record keeping;
7.2. without due diligence by GCSB on the capability tasking requests;
7.3. without full visibility for GCSB of the capability tasking;
7.4. without adequate training, support or guidance for GCSB operational staff;
7.5. with negligible awareness of the capability at a senior level within GCSB after the signing of the MOU in 2012 and until the system was shut down in 2020;
7.6. with no apparent access for GCSB to the outcomes of the capability’s operation at GCSB;
7.7. without any auditing;
7.8. without the required review of the MOU;
7.9. without due attention to the possibility, recognised within the Bureau, that support for the capability could contribute to military targeting; and
7.10. without clarity, in consequence, as to whether data supplied by the GCSB to the capability did in fact support military action.
The Inspector-General has found significant failings in the GCSB's hosting of a foreign partner's system. Read more here https://t.co/Zi8wa5OttB
— IGIS NZ (@igisnz) March 20, 2024
[*] as anyone who remembers the 1996 publication of this book already knows
“The Inspector-General has found significant failings in the GCSB’s hosting of a foreign partner’s system”
https://alecmuffett.com/article/109427
#fvey #gcsb #surveillance
![Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years who, being a person who owes allegiance to the Sovereign in right of New Zealand, within or outside New Zealand,—
(a) with intent to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand, communicates information or delivers any object to a country or organisation outside New Zealand or to a person acting on behalf of any such country or organisation; or
(b) with intent to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand and with the intention of communicating information or delivering any object to a country or organisation outside New Zealand or to a person acting on behalf of any such country or organisation,—
(i) collects or records any information; or
(ii) copies any document; or
(iii) obtains any object; or
(iv) makes any sketch, plan, model, or note; or
(v) takes any photograph; or
(vi) records any sound or image; or
(vii) delivers any object to any person,— if the communication or delivery or intended communication or intended delivery under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) is likely to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand.
[Section 78: replaced, on 1 July 1983, by section 2(1) of the Crimes Amendment Act (No 2) 1982 (1982 No 157).]](https://files.mastodon.social/cache/media_attachments/files/112/130/764/442/454/299/original/d69296e2a9e6b4a2.png)
@BobLefridge
Remember the Mossad spies traveling on deceased NZer's passports caught in Christchurch post the 2011 quake. I believe they were quietly escorted out of the country by the Key govt.
#NothingToSee #GCSB #NZPol
New Zealand's spooks have been very very bad boys, again.
This time hosting a foreign agency's intelligence program, with application in war, without telling anyone.
#GCSB #IGISNZ
https://igis.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/FINAL-Inquiry-into-GCSBs-hosting-of-a-foreign-capability.pdf
Hey... our spooks are building a $300m data centre at Whenuapai. I applaud the idea of storing sensitive data locally, but what's this from Andrew Little?
"Government agencies would continue to use privately-owned data centres to store the bulk of their information..."
What a pity we can't look after our own government information here.
Remember, there is no "cloud" -- it's just other people's computers.
"This is due to the way s53 of the Intelligence and Security Act is phrased, referring only to NZ citizens and permanent residents (that is, natural rather than legal persons). But it seems to be a loophole, resulting in a lower standard of oversight for spying on organisations (basicly, they only need approval from the (captive) Minister, rather than from the independent Commissioner of security warrants)."
https://norightturn.blogspot.com/2023/01/a-significant-loophole.html
Here's a questionable claim from a NZ public servant:
"There are [internet platform] companies that hold way more information about individuals and businesses than the [GCSB] would ever be able to access..."
#AndrewHampton, Director-General, #GCSB
Supreme Court Denies Kim Dotcom’s Appeal to Access Illegal Spy Recordings http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Torrentfreak/~3/FtNM9nARiu8/ #BreakingNews #SupremeCourt #MegaUpload #kimdotcom #spying #afeat #GCSB
US-dominated spook organizations like the #GCSB continue to claim that #Huawei routing gear is a security risk, without presenting a shred of evidence. Meanwhile, here's one of the many documented security holes in equipment made by their main competitor #Cisco:
https://fosstodon.org/@ticoombs/102866508124218271
📬Kim Dotcom erhält keinen Zugang zu Aufzeichnungen des GCSB📬 https://tarnkappe.info/kim-dotcom-erhaelt-keinen-zugang-zu-aufzeichnungen-des-gcsb/ #Geheimdienst #Megaupload #Neuseeland #KimDotcom #Artikel #GCSB
Court of Appeal Denies Kim Dotcom Access to Illegal Spy Recordings http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Torrentfreak/~3/6sxH_RFVwQo/ #CourtofAppeal #MegaUpload #NewZealand #kimdotcom #afeat #News #GCSB
@jeremiah one other thing, Levine claims that the real threat to user privacy isn't governments, but corporations. In my country, the #GCSB, which is our equivalent of the #NSA and a member of the #5Eyes, had law passed where it can directly regulate what hardware telecoms corporations use in their networks, with no public oversight:
https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/on-the-inside/377066/huawei-vs-five-eyes-nz-diplomatic-ties-at-centre-of-dilemma
So Levine is dead wrong, and having those claims published in the #Baffer can only cause damage.
Neuseeland: Netzpolitische Wahlprogramme im Vergleich – https://netzpolitik.org/2017/neuseeland-netzpolitische-wahlprogramme-im-vergleich/ #Informationsfreiheit #Netzneutralität #DigitalRights #geheimdienste #Wahlprogramme #Netzpolitik #Datenschutz #e-Democracy #Überwachung #neuseeland #Wahlkampf #National #NZFirst #Greens #Labour #GCSB
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