#clientSideScanning

Miguel Afonso Caetanoremixtures@tldr.nettime.org
2025-07-04

"Billions of people worldwide use private messaging platforms like Signal, WhatsApp, and iMessage to communicate securely. This is possible thanks to end-to-end encryption (E2EE), which ensures that only the sender and the intended recipient(s) can view the contents of a message, with no access possible for any third party, not even the service provider itself. Despite the widespread adoption of E2EE apps, including by government officials, and the role of encryption in safeguarding human rights, encryption, which can be lifesaving, is under attack around the world. These attacks most often come in the form of client-side scanning (CSS), which is already being pushed in the EU, UK, U.S., and Australia.

CSS involves scanning the photos, videos, and messages on an individual’s device against a database of known objectionable material, before the content is then sent onwards via an encrypted messaging platform. Before an individual uploads a file to an encrypted messaging window, it would be converted into a digital fingerprint, or “hash,” and compared against a database of digital fingerprints of prohibited material. Such a database could be housed on a person’s device, or at the server level.

Proponents of CSS argue that it is a privacy-respecting method of checking content in the interests of online safety, but as we explain in this FAQ piece, CSS undermines the privacy and security enabled by E2EE platforms. It is at odds with the principles of necessity and proportionality, and its implementation would erode the trustworthiness of E2EE channels; the most crucial tool we have for communicating securely and privately in a digital ecosystem dominated by trigger-happy surveillance."

accessnow.org/why-client-side-

#CyberSecurity #Encryption #ClientSideScanning #E2EE #Privacy #DataProtection #Surveillance

Alec Muffettalecmuffett
2025-06-25

IN CASE YOU MISSED IT: aren’t you glad that we don’t (yet) live in a world where on-device client side surveillance triggers report you to the police for using words like “bomb” or “uranium” in Signal & WhatsApp chats?
alecmuffett.com/article/113606

2025-06-24

IN CASE YOU MISSED IT: aren’t you glad that we don’t (yet) live in a world where on-device client side surveillance triggers report you to the police for using words like “bomb” or “uranium” in Signal & WhatsApp chats?

If such things did exist they would currently be swamped by people discussing global news:

Exclusive: Early US intel assessment suggests strikes on Iran did not destroy nuclear sites, sources say

https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/politics/intel-assessment-us-strikes-iran-nuclear-sites

#apple #censorship #clientSideScanning #endToEndEncryption #homeOffice #meta #signal #surveillance #whatsapp

Peter :antifa:🧷pludikovsky@chaos.social
2025-06-24

Denmark wants to succeed where

- Sweden 🇸🇪
- Spain 🇪🇸
- Belgium 🇧🇪
- Hungary 🇭🇺
- and Poland 🇵🇱

have failed.

netzpolitik.org/2025/eu-ratspr

#ChatControl #ClientSideScanning #Surveillance

Peter :antifa:🧷pludikovsky@chaos.social
2025-06-24

Dänemark will schaffen womit schon

- Schweden 🇸🇪
- Spanien 🇪🇸
- Belgien 🇧🇪
- Ungarn 🇭🇺
- und Polen 🇵🇱

gescheitert sind.

netzpolitik.org/2025/eu-ratspr

#Chatkontrolle #ClientSideScanning #Überwachung

Alec Muffettalecmuffett
2025-06-02

Let’s all take a moment to consider that if — as demanded by Ofcom — encrypted messenger systems WERE actually monitoring conversations for words like: drone, bomb, explosive… all reports would currently be swamped
alecmuffett.com/article/113431

Alec Muffettalecmuffett
2025-06-02

I don’t have official confirmation, but I’m unilaterally declaring dibs on inspiration for this WhatsApp advertising campaign…
alecmuffett.com/article/113418

2025-06-02

Let’s all take a moment to consider that if — as demanded by Ofcom — encrypted messenger systems WERE actually monitoring conversations for words like: drone, bomb, explosive… all reports would currently be swamped

I don’t know about you but I have several WhatsApp and Signal chats which are currently burning with discussion of how war has changed and what battle risks are inherent in new technology.

Should that all be censored in pursuit of keeping us safe from terrorists?

#clientSideScanning #drones #endToEndEncryption #ofcom #onlineSafety #signal #ukraine #whatsapp

2025-06-01

I don’t have official confirmation, but I’m unilaterally declaring dibs on inspiration for this WhatsApp advertising campaign…

Compare and contrast this tweet of mine from 2021 – recounting a true event – which I’ve been reposting & citing everywhere ever since:

https://twitter.com/AlecMuffett/status/1405962815068835842

#childSafety #clientSideScanning #endToEndEncryption #onlineSafety #privacy #whatsapp

2025-05-23

@eighthave Agreed. People talking about #PQC and breaking #e2ee in the future, while closed source apps, OSes and #ClientSideScanning ML/AI agents can simply take a detour around it today!

Konstantin Macherpneutig@eupolicy.social
2025-03-05

Dienstag 11.03. steht die #Chatkontrolle wieder auf der Tagesordnung der Ratsarbeitsgruppe Strafverfolgung. Der polnische Vorsitz im Rat hat Ende Januar einen Vorschlag gemacht bei dem #ClientSideScanning für Unternehmen nicht mehr verpflichtend wäre.

Aber: Unternehmen dürften freiwillig private Nachrichten scannen und werden dazu auch angehalten, außerdem Pflicht zu technischen Alterskontrollen.

@edri gibt einen Überblick und schaut in die 🔮 wie es weiter gehen könnte:
edri.org/our-work/poland-searc

2025-02-09

Genau darum: #GrapheneOS und #Linux

grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/

"Wir arbeiten ständig an der Entwicklung neuer Steuerelemente und Funktionen, um Ihre Unterhaltungen in Google Messages noch sicherer und privater zu gestalten." -> security.googleblog.com/2024/1

"Das Problem des KI-gestützten clientseitigen Scannens ist auch seine hohe Fehlerquote. Mit 10-20 Prozent fälschlich gekennzeichneter Inhalte ist zu rechnen." -> mastodon.social/@Tutanota/1139

#ClientSideScanning #Datenschutz #privatsphare

Brazen4nonBrazen4non
2025-02-08
2025-02-08

A few folks are questioning if AI scanning like what Android is doing can be missused. The last time a similar feature was coming to Apple's iOS the media rightly described it as an extremely dangerous warrantless surveillance tool.

Regardless of what Android developers intended this client side scanner to do it will be enlisted by governments of the world to spy on you and break strong encryption.

9to5mac.com/2023/09/01/csam-sc

#privacy #cybersecurity #apple #android #ai #clientsidescanning

Freedom not Fearfnf@eupolicy.social
2024-12-12

#ChatControl proposal failed in the Council of the EU again today! 🎉

Hungary tried to use its presidency to shame critical governments into agreeing to the proposed mass surveillance by forcing ministers to explain themselves during live-streamed public session. This plan backfired:
several countries took the floor to confirm on the record that this would undermine #cybersecurity, attack #encryption with #ClientSideScanning and violate fundamental rights!
video.consilium.europa.eu/even
#StopScanningMe

Konstantin Macherpneutig@eupolicy.social
2024-12-12

Kurioserweise hat Ungarn die Kritik an der #Chatkontrolle heute gestärkt: wir haben die Bestätigung für unsere Kritik an #ClientSideScanning, Angriff auf Verschlüsselung, unvereinbar mit Grundrechten etc. jetzt auf Kamera, ausgesprochen von Minister*innen im Rat der EU. Die Clips können wir jetzt jedes Mal zeigen, wenn die EU-Kommission wieder versucht diese Probleme zu leugnen!

Freedom not Fearfnf@eupolicy.social
2024-12-11

There has not been progress on the #ChatControl proposal in Council of the EU because many governments still push for undermining encryption. #ClientSideScanning
The Council's own legal service has established that the proposal is incompatible with European fundamental rights and would violate the very essence of the right to privacy.

Konstantin Macherpneutig@eupolicy.social
2024-12-04

2021 wurde #Chatkontrolle 1.0 beschlossen, eine TEMPORÄRE Ausnahme von der #ePrivacy-Richtlinie und Online-Plattformen damit zum Scannen privater Kommunikation auf CSAM ermächtigt.
Aktuell soll Chatkontrollle 2.0 daraus eine Pflicht für Online-Anbieter zum Scannen nach bekanntem Material via #ClientSideScanning machen.
Für freiwilliges Scannen nach unbekanntem Material und Grooming will Ungarn jetzt die Chatkontrolle 1.0 **AUF 10 JAHRE** verlängern. WTF
@netzpolitik_feed:
netzpolitik.org/2024/letzter-a

2024-11-08

Ich weiß zwar nicht was das #FBI in deutschen #telegram chats zu suchen hat. Aber der Fall zeigt auf, dass man weder #Netzsperren, noch #Vorratsdatenspeicherung zur #Bestandsdatenauskunft noch ein technisches Aufbrechen der EzuE-#Verschlüsselung oder technisches #clientsidescanning braucht, um Terror zu bekämpfen. #sächsischeseparatisten #Faschos #afd @tagesschau tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr

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