#EndToEndEncryption

2025-12-14

**SEO-заглавие**
Wi-Fi HaLow (IEEE 802.11ah): дальнобойная альтернатива LoRa и MANET для IoT и автономной связи
**Заглавие**
Wi-Fi HaLow: Wi-Fi, который уходит за горизонт
**Подзаголовок**
Как стандарт IEEE 802.11ah закрывает разрыв между LoRa и военными MANET — по дальности, скорости и цене
**Целевая аудитория (ЦА)**
Инженеры и ИТ-специалисты, IoT-разработчики, исследователи беспроводных сетей, OSINT-аналитики, энтузиасты автономной и децентрализованной связи, специалисты по гражданской защите и критической инфраструктуре.
**Вступление**
Wi-Fi HaLow (IEEE 802.11ah) — редкий случай, когда академический стандарт выходит за рамки лабораторий и начинает конкурировать сразу с двумя мирами: медленными, но дешёвыми LoRa-сетями и дорогими, закрытыми военными MANET-системами. Работая в субгигагерцовом диапазоне, HaLow сочетает километровую дальность, высокую пропускную способность и привычную Wi-Fi-экосистему. Это делает его интересным не только для IoT, но и для сценариев автономной связи — от полевых исследований до чрезвычайных ситуаций, где интернет и сотовые сети перестают существовать как класс.

#WiFiHaLow #IEEE80211ah #SubGHzWiFi #IoT #LPWAN
#АвтономнаяСвязь #ДецентрализованныеСети #MeshNetworking #MANET #LoRa
#EmergencyComms #OffGrid #DisasterResponse #FieldTesting
#WirelessResearch #NetworkSecurity #WPA3 #EndToEndEncryption
#RaspberryPi #BATMANADV #OLSR #PeerToPeer
#AdHocNetworks #CriticalInfrastructure #ResilientNetworks

В этом видеообзоре разбирается Wi-Fi HaLow (IEEE 802.11ah) как практическая технология для автономной и децентрализованной связи вне интернета и сотовых сетей. Показано, чем субгигагерцовый Wi-Fi отличается от LoRa-решений вроде Meshtastic и почему он закрывает нишу между медленными LPWAN и дорогими военными MANET-системами.
На конкретных примерах объясняется, как Wi-Fi HaLow обеспечивает километровую дальность, высокую пропускную способность, нормальную IP-сеть и шифрование уровня WPA3, позволяя передавать голос, видео и файлы напрямую между устройствами. Отдельно рассматривается подключение модулей к смартфонам и Raspberry Pi, формирование локальной сети, а также использование peer-to-peer приложений без центральных серверов.
Видео опирается не на маркетинг, а на инженерную и научную базу: упоминаются академические исследования IEEE 802.11ah, реальные ограничения технологии, регуляторные нюансы и сценарии, где HaLow имеет смысл — от полевых условий и походов до аварийной связи и экспериментов с mesh-сетями.

t.me/Decloaking/8073

**Дисклеймер**
Материалы и выводы, приведённые в этом тексте, носят обзорный и информационный характер и не являются прямыми рекомендациями к практическому применению. Реальные результаты зависят от условий эксплуатации, конфигураций оборудования, нормативных ограничений в конкретных юрисдикциях и уровня подготовки операторов. Любые полевые испытания должны проводиться с соблюдением действующих законов о радиочастотах, с учётом требований по электробезопасности и кибербезопасности. Использование сетевых технологий в критических сценариях предполагает обязательное тестирование в контролируемой среде перед внедрением в продуктив.
**Для дальнейшего исследования и испытаний**
Вы можете использовать следующий ресурс для координации, обмена опытом и документирования полевых тестов, а также для сбора ссылок на публикации, схемы, конфигурации и отчёты:
retroshare://channel?name=Wi-Fi%20HaLow%20%28IEEE%20802.11ah%29%3A%20%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B9%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F%20%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%20LoRa%20%D0%B8%20MANET%20%D0%B4%D0%BB%D1%8F%20IoT%20%D0%B8%20%D0%B0%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B9%20%D1%81%D0%B2%D1%8F%D0%B7%D0%B8&id=693baa50075a061f1e3f5a5e068aee9a&msgid=257270c5e96088f779e148b929377e8d0688f25f
Этот канал может служить концентратором ссылок на:
академические публикации и обзоры по IEEE 802.11ah;
примеры конфигураций оборудования для HaLow;
отчёты по полевым испытаниям vs LoRa и MANET;
методологии тестирования дальности, пропускной способности и устойчивости;
рекомендации по интеграции с приложениями реального времени.

Кому религия не позволяет в ретро: Wi-Fi HaLow: Wi-Fi, который уходит за горизонт
orwellboxxx4.blogspot.com/p/wi

Пара монет и вот это все: Поддержите проект криптовалютой: Bitcoin, Litecoin, PKOIN и Tari – безопасные донаты без посредников
orwellboxxx4.blogspot.com/2025

2025-12-12

EU Revives Plan for Year-Long Online Data Retention | Reclaim the Net

A Council paper now circulating (via Netzpolitik) among member states outlines a plan that would apply not only to telecom operators but to nearly every major digital service, including cloud platforms, domain hosts, payment processors, and even end-to-end encrypted messengers such as WhatsApp and Signal. Officials insist they do not intend to compromise encryption or read private messages. What they want is the so-called metadata: who contacted whom, from where, at what time, and through which service.

https://reclaimthenet.org/eu-revives-plan-for-year-long-data-retention

#chatControl #endToEndEncryption #privacy #surveillance

Ars Technica Newsarstechnica@c.im
2025-12-04

Engineer proves that Kohler’s smart toilet cameras aren’t very private arstechni.ca/GEsU #endtoendencryption #smarthome #cameras #Tech #e2ee

ReclaimTheNet: “ChatControl was meant to be temporary, the promotion of mass scanning of private messages until data proved it worked. The data never came.” https://alecmuffett.com/article/132603 #ChatControl #EndToEndEncryption #censorship #privacy #surveillance

ReclaimTheNet: “ChatControl wa...

Alec Muffettalecmuffett
2025-12-04

ReclaimTheNet: “ChatControl was meant to be temporary, the promotion of mass scanning of private messages until data proved it worked. The data never came.”
alecmuffett.com/article/132603

Benjamin Carr, Ph.D. 👨🏻‍💻🧬BenjaminHCCarr@hachyderm.io
2025-12-04

Swiss Data Protection Group Says #US #Cloud Giants Can't Meet #Privacy Standards
#privatim identified five critical problems:
Most #SaaS solutions lack #endtoendencryption.
Global companies offer insufficient transparency for compliance verification.
Cloud services create significant loss of control over data.
Legal uncertainty exists for data under confidentiality obligations.
US #CLOUDAct allows data access regardless of storage location.
itsfoss.com/news/privatim-decl
#hyperscale #AWS #Google #Azure

EFF: “After Years of Controversy, the EU’s Chat Control Nears Its Final Hurdle: What to Know” https://alecmuffett.com/article/133436 #ChatControl #EndToEndEncryption #censorship #privacy #surveillance

EFF: “After Years of Controver...

Alec Muffettalecmuffett
2025-12-04

EFF: “After Years of Controversy, the EU’s Chat Control Nears Its Final Hurdle: What to Know”
alecmuffett.com/article/133436

2025-12-04

ReclaimTheNet: “ChatControl was meant to be temporary, the promotion of mass scanning of private messages until data proved it worked. The data never came.”

https://reclaimthenet.org/eu-chat-control-law-permanent-privacy-risks-error-rates-lack-evidence

It was supposed to be a stopgap measure, a temporary derogation of privacy rights until proper evidence came in. Now, if you’ve been following our previous reporting, you’ll know the Council wants to make it permanent, even though the Commission’s own 2025 evaluation report admits it has no evidence the thing actually works.

Via:

https://twitter.com/ReclaimTheNetHQ/status/1995880801632702694

#censorship #chatControl #endToEndEncryption #privacy #surveillance

2025-12-04

EFF: “After Years of Controversy, the EU’s Chat Control Nears Its Final Hurdle: What to Know”

Good primer on the remaining badness:

After a years-long battle, the European Commission’s “Chat Control” plan, which would mandate mass scanning and other encryption-breaking measures, at last codifies agreement on a position within the Council of the EU, representing EU States. The good news is that the most controversial part, the forced requirement to scan encrypted messages, is out. The bad news is there’s more to it than that.

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/after-years-controversy-eus-chat-control-nears-its-final-hurdle-what-know

#censorship #chatControl #endToEndEncryption #privacy #surveillance

Alterego_Midshipmanolukawy@qoto.org
2025-11-28

Готово — английский перевод + хэштеги в конце.
Below is what I found about the Mycelium developers and the project itself (its goals, architecture, and status).
👤 Who is behind Mycelium — developers and initiators
Mycelium is developed by ThreeFold (ThreeFold Tech / ThreeFold Grid).
In official announcements, a contributor named **Lee Smet** is mentioned as leading the effort to build a new IPv6 overlay network.
The project is open-source, with the repository hosted on GitHub.
ThreeFold is an organization promoting decentralized networks and infrastructure. Mycelium is a component of their ecosystem — not a third-party plugin, but a native project.
🛠 What is Mycelium — architecture and key properties
Mycelium is:
An IPv6 overlay network written in Rust.
When joining, each node receives an IPv6 address from the `400::/7` range.
All connections are end-to-end encrypted; each node has a public/private key pair, and its network address is cryptographically tied to the private key.
The network is **locality-aware** — routing chooses optimal paths with minimal latency.
It supports multiple transport protocols: TCP, QUIC, etc.
Routing is inspired by (or partially based on) the **Babel routing protocol**.
Mycelium can operate without a TUN interface (as a **message bus only**) for lightweight encrypted data exchange.
The repository includes a **message-system** layer enabling encrypted messaging above the network layer.
📡 Project goals, design, and future direction
Mycelium aims to deliver a **secure, efficient and scalable** alternative to the traditional Internet with focus on privacy, decentralization, and resilience.
It is designed as part of the wider **ThreeFold Grid** ecosystem — serving as the network backbone for their services.
The developers target **planet-scale scalability**.
Mycelium is positioned not only as a private networking solution, but as infrastructure for many scenarios: secure P2P communications, self-hosting, IoT networking, decentralized services, cloud infrastructures, CDN-like usage, etc.
As of 2024–2025, Mycelium remains under active development — scaling is a key focus.
✅ Status, implementation and limitations
Mycelium is operational with builds available for Linux, macOS, Windows; iOS and Android are planned / in beta.
Documentation claims support for **up to ~100,000 nodes** within a single network.
Planned improvements include: enhanced resilience, NAT support, QUIC hole-punching, protocol expansion, easier deployment.
Mycelium is an actively maintained open-source project under the Apache-2.0 license.
🔎 Summary — strengths and potential risks
**Strengths:**
High-level security and privacy: true E2E encryption and crypto-bound addressing.
Decentralization — no single point of control.
Flexible: full IPv6 network or lightweight encrypted message bus.
Suitable for many use cases: private networking, P2P, IoT, remote work, decentralized services, private Internet access.
**Limitations / risks:**
Still maturing — global scaling goal remains unproven.
P2P overlay networks always depend on trust and correct configuration of peers.
Unclear real-world adoption and number of active nodes — affects reliability.
Some external services may still see public exit IP addresses (e.g., through NAT), which may reduce anonymity in practice.
If you want, I can **check live network metrics** — number of active nodes, adoption level, known issues, etc.
Hashtags
#Mycelium #ThreeFold #OverlayNetwork #IPv6 #RustLang #EndToEndEncryption #Decentralized #CyberSecurity #P2P #PrivateNetworking #SecureCommunication #NextGenInternet #ZeroTrust #NetworkingTech

matrix.to/#/!NggrnptZjGBkegXXq

Alec Muffettalecmuffett
2025-11-27

Mullvad” “An important victory – but we still need to stop Chat Control”
alecmuffett.com/article/128937

2025-11-27

Mullvad” “An important victory – but we still need to stop Chat Control”

From the outset, Chat Control was a proposal that aimed to introduce mass surveillance. That ambition is clearly still present … among many of the member states in the Council. [It] failed to introduce mass surveillance but has succeeded in paving the way for new attempts

https://twitter.com/mullvadnet/status/1993740699163087061

Long tweet. Full version:

The Council of Ministers in the EU has, after three years, now reached a common position on Chat Control. The requirement for mandatory scanning (including end-to-end encrypted messaging services) has been removed, which is a major victory. The EU Council failed to implement mandatory mass surveillance. However, in its proposal, they are laying the groundwork for mass surveillance in the future.

What happens now?

The Council will now enter negotiations with the European Parliament, led by the European Commission. We urge the Parliament to stand firm in the trilogue negotiations and not deviate an inch from its previous position, demanding: no mass surveillance whatsoever without suspicion and a court order, no ID-verification requirements, and no censorship of legal content.

The EU Council is preparing for mandatory mass surveillance and censorship

The Council’s version of Chat Control includes voluntary scanning, vaguely worded legislation that may entail requirements for age verification and mandatory ID checks (even for end-to-end encrypted services), and an article stating that the requirement for mandatory scanning shall be reconsidered every three years. They also introduce a new infrastructure for blocking material, where it is up to each member state to block what they consider illegal. At the same time, a massive EU center is being established to work exclusively on this. All in all, this indicates that the EU Council is aiming to build an infrastructure for mass surveillance, and the legislative proposal is written in a way that opens the door to it.

The EU Council’s Chat Control version

– The EU Council’s Chat Control version introduces a new type of scanning for so-called new material and grooming. This means that AI will scan people’s conversations, photos and videos, in search of criminal content. This will result in enormous numbers of false positives, and people’s private lives will move from an AI detection to being examined by employees at a new EU center. This is mass surveillance and people’s private lives will be scanned without any suspicion and without a court order. This scanning is carried out in cooperation with American companies and can at any time be used to scan for virtually anything; Europol has already requested broader scanning and wants access to material that is not illegal.

– Every three years, the European Commission will challenge the law and attempt to force mandatory scanning (even for end-to-end-encrypted services). Messaging services (including end-to-end encrypted) must take “all reasonable measures” to reduce the risk of their services being misused, including implementation of age verification. This means that the EU may require ID checks and ban anonymous use of messaging services and social media. This poses problems for people who criticize those in power in authoritarian countries, for whistleblowers who want to leak documents, and for sources who wish to speak anonymously with journalists.

– A new infrastructure for blocking material is introduced, where it’s up to each of the member states to issue blocking orders for what they consider illegal. This implies that content that is illegal in one country will also be blocked in a country where it is legal. Once this infrastructure is in place, it also opens the door to a slippery slope when it comes to censorship.

Stop Chat Control

From the outset, Chat Control was a proposal that aimed to introduce mass surveillance. That ambition is clearly still present within the Commission and among many of the member states in the Council. The Council failed to introduce mass surveillance but has succeeded in paving the way for new attempts. This applies not only to future proposals for mandatory chat control scanning every three years. This is part of a broader development in which private and secure communication is being challenged by forces seeking to introduce mass surveillance. ProtectEU is a rebranded Chat Control, aimed at banning encryption. National laws are trying to do the same. We need to put a stop to these attempts here and now.

#censorship #chatControl #endToEndEncryption #privacy #surveillance

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